Mathematical Economics Sunspot equilibrium and International trade with tariffs by Mohammad Choubdar Soltan Ahmadi
Mohammad Choubdar Soltan Ahmadi
Mathematical Economics
Sunspot equilibrium and
International trade with tariffs
Julho de 2014
Mohammad Choubdar Soltan Ahmadi
Economia Matema´tica
Equil´ıbrios Sunspot e
Come´rcio Internacional com tarifas
Tese submetida a` Faculdade de Cieˆncias da Universidade do Porto
para obtenc¸a˜o do grau de Doutor em Matema´tica
Julho de 2014

Acknowledgments
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Alberto Adrego Pinto for all the guidance
and support he has provided me during my studies at the University of Porto.
I would also like to thank Prof. Diogo Pinheiro for all the collaboration and co-authorship
during my PhD period.
I thank the financial support of LIAAD–INESC TEC through program PEst, Faculty of
Sciences, University of Porto and Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia (FCT). My research
was supported by FCT - Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e Tecnologia grant with reference SFRH / BD
/ 51173 / 2010.
Last, but no means least, I would like to thank my beloved wife, Marjan, for her love and
encouragement.
i
ii
Resumo
A presente tese esta´ dividida em duas partes. Na primeira parte sa˜o estudadas falhas de co-
ordenac¸a˜o de expectativas e a sua relac¸a˜o com a resilieˆncia de equil´ıbrios do tipo sunspot sob
perturbac¸o˜es aleato´rias. A segunda parte da tese estuda os efeitos da imposic¸a˜o de tarifas no
come´rcio internacional sob o ponto de vista da teoria dos jogos.
Desvios de trajeto´rias associadas a um equil´ıbrio de previsa˜o perfeito podem ser interpreta-
dos como falhas de coordenac¸a˜o de expectativas por parte de agentes econo´micos. Nesta tese
consideramos os dois casos limite em que tais desvios sa˜o, respectivamente, de pequena e grande
amplitude. No que diz respeito ao limite no qual os desvios sa˜o de pequena amplitude, mostramos
que estes geram um processo estoca´stico estaciona´rio que esta´ pro´ximo ou da medida de probabili-
dade estaciona´ria de um equil´ıbrio sunspot ou da medida de probabilidade associada a uma o´rbita
perio´dica da dinaˆmica determin´ıstica subjacente. No que diz respeito a desvios de grande am-
plitude, obtemos condic¸o˜es sob as quais tais sistemas dinaˆmicos aleato´rios admitem uma medida
invariante absolutamente cont´ınua e ergo´dica e obtemos um minorante positivo para o expoente
de Lyapunov. Tais resultados sa˜o ilustrados no contexto de um modelo de equil´ıbrio geral com
sobreposic¸a˜o de gerac¸o˜es.
Na segunda parte desta tese, estudamos um modelo de come´rcio internacional com incerteza
nos custos de produc¸a˜o das firmas como um jogo estrate´gico nas tarifas dos governos. Para tal,
consideramos duas empresas situadas em dois pa´ıses e que vendem o mesmo bem homoge´neo
em ambos os pa´ıses. Os governos de cada pa´ıs decidem aplicar, ou na˜o, tarifas sobre as im-
portac¸o˜es dos bens produzidos no outro pa´ıs. Calculamos o equil´ıbrio de Nash, o equil´ıbrio de
Bayesian-Nash, e os correspondentes equil´ıbrios sociais o´timos para as func¸o˜es de utilidade que
sa˜o determinadas pelas quantidades econo´micas relevantes. Observamos que os equil´ıbrios de
Nash na˜o coincidem com os equil´ıbrios sociais o´timos o que gera as dificuldades mais pertinentes
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no come´rcio internacional, mas a nossa ana´lise permite que estas dificuldades possam ser parcial-
mente resolvidas com recurso a acordos comerciais. Mostramos para o equil´ıbrio de Bayesian-
Nash que o lucro esperado das empresas e que o bem-estar esperado dos pa´ıses aumentam com a
incerteza (variaˆncias) dos custos de produc¸a˜o de ambas as empresas.
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Abstract
This thesis consists of two parts. Part one studies the expectations coordination failures and
sunspot equilibrium under effects of random perturbations. Part two studies the effects of tariffs
in international trade from game theory point of view.
Deviations from a perfect foresight equilibrium path can be seen as coordination failures
of expectations. In this thesis we consider the two limiting cases where such deviations are,
respectively, small and large. For the limit case of small deviations, we show that these generate a
stationary stochastic process which is close either to the stationary probability of a chaotic sunspot
equilibrium or to a deterministic cycle. For the case of large deviations, we provide conditions
under which an ergodic absolutely continuous invariant measure exists for such random dynamical
systems and we obtain a positive lower bound for the corresponding Lyapunov exponent. We
illustrate these results using an overlapping generations model.
In the second part, we study the international trade model with uncertainty on the produc-
tion costs of the firms as a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. We consider two
firms located in different countries selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. Each
government decides to impose or not a strategic tariff in the imports. We use the relevant eco-
nomic quantities as the utilities of these strategic games and we compute the social optimum,
the Nash equilibrium and the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We observe that the Nash equilibrium
does not coincide with social optimum which is a main difficulty in international trade, but our
analysis allow that these difficulties can be partially dealt with the use of trade agreements. For
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, we show that the expected profit of the firms and the expected
welfare of the countries increase with the variances of the production costs of both firms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, we study two distinct models in Mathematical Economics. In chapter 2, we study
expectations coordination failures and random perturbations of sunspot equilibrium in a macro
economics model. In chapter 3, we study the effects of tariffs in a well-known international trade
from a game theory point of view. Hence, for clarity of exposition, we separate the introduction
in two parts.
1.1 Expectations Coordination Failures and Sunspot Equilibrium
Expectations coordination failures (ECF) is a concern in the recent literature of dynamics models
with heterogeneous agents ([28], [50], [15], [29] and [4]). The heterogeneity in beliefs is a source
of deviations from the traditional hypothesis of Rational Expectations (RE) and it is a challenge
to find how far the actual dynamics under ECF is from the classical RE equilibrium.
The concept of sunspot equilibrium (SE) was firstly introduced to model the psychology of
the market and the expectations of completely rational agents. In particular, Cass and Shell
[13] defined the concept of sunspot equilibrium in the context of general equilibrium to study
the influence of the agents expectations on market outcomes. More precisely, the notion of
sunspot equilibria models the case where the market outcomes do not depend on the economy
fundamentals, but rather on some external variable, representing the agents’ beliefs about the
future states of the world.
More recently, Lucas and Stokey [35] have argued that sunspots and contagion effects are
sources of liquidity crises. They brought the argument of Cass and Shell [13] on expectation
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coordination to explain bank runs and consequently, the financial crises of 2008.
Sunspot equilibrium has been an active research area during the past decades and there exists
an extensive literature in the subject nowadays. A good review for sunspot equilibria in economics
models is the one by Chiappori and Guesnerie in [14]. In what concerns potential applications of
the concept of sunspot equilibrium, this has been used to model subjects as distinct as bank-runs
[40], lotteries [47, 48] and behavioral economics [19].
In sequential markets, given the present value of the state variable, a SE is a “zero” of the
excess demand function realized as a transition function defining the conditional probability of
reaching some given set of future state variable values. A SE is stationary if there exists a
probability measure which is preserved under convolution with the transition function. From the
economical point of view, this corresponds to saying that agents can move up and down in the
earnings and wealth distribution while keeping the initial corresponding distribution invariant
over time.
As we can see, the existence of SE requires that not only agents coordinate expectations, but
also that they have to do it by using an extrinsic event. In spite of this seeming to be an extremely
strong hypothesis, our result asserts that allowing for a lack of expectation coordination, the final
stochastic dynamics are almost the same.
It is worth noting that despite the fact that there exist some learning rules that allow the
convergence to the SE ([51] and [1]), they assume the knowledge of the agents of some particular
features of the economy.
In section 2.1 of this thesis we will study how small deviations from a perfect foresight equilib-
rium representing possible expectations coordination failures lead the state variable to a stationary
process. Using the results of dynamics of unimodal maps presented below, we prove that depend-
ing on the parameter values of the model the stationary process is close to one of two types of
equilibria, namely, close to a deterministic cycle or close to the invariant measure of the global
chaotic sunspot equilibrium (SE) presented in [1] (see [2]). That sort of SE arises in one-period
looking forward economies where the backward perfect foresight map exhibits a chaotic behaviour
and possesses a stationary probability distribution that is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure. Thus, small failures in coordination will produce stationary processes
which are similar to either a chaotic SE or a deterministic cycle.
On the other hand, on Section 2.2 we consider the case of large random deviations from
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sunspot equilibria associated with unimodal backward perfect foresight maps. To proceed with
our analysis, we start by considering how do “large” random perturbations change the asymptotic
behaviour of a rather general class of unimodal maps. We provide appropriate conditions under
which the random dynamical systems associated with the perturbed dynamics have an ergodic
and absolutely continuous invariant measure with a positive lower bound for the corresponding
Lyapunov exponent. Using such general results as a guideline, we move on to perform a numerical
study of a family of random dynamical systems defined by random perturbations of backward
perfect foresight maps known to yield sunspot equilibria for large subsets of parameter space.
Contrary to what is done in Section 2.1, we do not consider the zero noise limit, but rather the
case of non vanishing noise. We find evidence in support of the claim that random perturbations
of such backward perfect foresight maps admit an absolutely continuous invariant measure with
a positive Lyapunov exponent with smaller requirements in what concerns the size of the random
perturbations when compared with the conditions required for the proof of our abstract results
(see [3]).
The dynamics of unimodal maps play a central role in our analysis and it is a central topic in
the modern dynamical system theory (see e.g. [16] for an overview). Namely, there has been great
interest in the study of properties such as the existence and uniqueness of absolutely continuous
invariant probability measures for this class of dynamical system (see [10, 31, 38]). A more recent
topic of research concerns the stochastic stability of dynamical systems defined by unimodal
maps under perturbations given by sequences of independent and identically distributed random
variables. Results in this direction have been obtained by Benedicks and Young in [9] for the
quadratic map family and with respect to the convergence induced by the weak∗-topology. Later
on, Baladi and Viana proved in [7] the strong stochastic stability, i.e. with respect to the norm
topology, for a wider class of unimodal maps. On the other hand, Lian and Stenlund [34] provide
conditions under which a sufficiently large additive perturbation of multimodal maps of the circle
yields a random dynamical system with an ergodic and absolutely continuous invariant with a
positive lower bound for the corresponding Lyapunov exponent for almost every point of the
circle. In section 2.2, we extended the results of Lian and Stenlund [34] to unimodal maps of the
interval (see [3]).
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1.2 International trade and game theory
In chapter 3 we will study the effects of tariffs in international trade from game theory point
of view. There is a vast literature in international trade models with complete and incomplete
information (see, for instance, [11, 12, 17, 18, 25, 33, 36, 20, 24, 23, 21, 22, 41, 46, 45]). Here, we
consider a usual duopoly international trade model with complete and incomplete information,
where there are two countries and a firm in each country that sells in its own country and exports
to the other one (see [26]).
The international trade model has two stages: in the first stage, the governments simulta-
neously choose their tariff rates; and in the second stage, the firms observe the tariff rates and
simultaneously choose their quantities for home consumption and for export.
The decision of the governments to impose or not tariffs can be interpreted as the actions
of a game specified by the utilities considered for each country. The utilities (games) of the
countries that we analysis are the relevant economic quantities of the international trade model
for the consumers and firms. In particular, we consider the utilities given by the home quantities,
the export quantities, the profit of the firms, the consumer surplus, the custom revenue and the
welfare of the countries.
In section 3.1, we show for each one of the above utilities that there is a Nash equilibrium and
a social optimum equilibrium (see [42] and [43]). Then, for each utility we classify the game in one
of the following three typical classes depending of the values obtained for the Nash equilibrium
and for the social optimum value: the social equilibrium (SE), where the social optimum coincides
with the Nash equilibrium; the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), where both utilities are bigger in the
social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium; and the lose-win social strategies (LW), where
one of the utilities is bigger in the social optimum and the other utility is bigger in the Nash
equilibrium.
If the game is of prisoner’s dilemma (PD) type, both governments can make a trade agreement
such that they can improve their utilities by choosing the social tariffs. If the game is of the lose-
win social strategies (LW) type, both governments can make a trade agreement such that both
countries opt by the social tariffs but the wining country should compensate the loss of the other
country. If the game is of the social equilibrium (SE) type, then there is a priori no need of a
trade agreement.
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In section 3.2, we introduce uncertainty effects on the production costs. We consider, as usual
in the incomplete information literature, that each firm knows its own production cost but does
not know the other firm’s production cost.
We show that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production
costs (see [44]). We prove that the expected welfare of each government increases with the
variances of the production costs of both firms. Furthermore, the effect of the variance of the
production costs of the foreign firm is lower than the effect of the variance of the production costs
of the home firm in the increase of the welfare of the home government.
As before, the decision of the governments to impose or not a tariff can be interpreted as a
game where the utilities are the expected welfares of the governments. In a fixed range of the
exogenous parameters, we show that this game has similarities with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
in the following sense (see [26]): The Nash equilibrium of the game consists of both governments
to impose the tariffs obtained as the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the trade international model.
However, the welfares of the governments are higher in the case where both governments do not
impose tariffs than in the case where both governments choose to impose the Bayesian-Nash
tariffs. Furthermore, if both governments do not impose tariffs then each government has an
incentive to unilateral deviate from the zero tariff.
Further study is needed, for example, in the cases where the countries have different political,
economical or social attitudes or different market sizes.
5
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Chapter 2
Expectations Coordination Failures
and Sunspot Equilibrium
Deviations from a perfect foresight equilibrium path can be seen as coordination failures of ex-
pectations. In this chapter we will consider the two limiting cases where such deviations are,
respectively, small and large.
For the limit case of small deviations, we show that such these generate a stationary stochastic
process which is close either to the stationary probability of a chaotic sunspot equilibrium or to
a deterministic cycle. We illustrate the results using an overlapping generations model with
parameter values satisfying the sufficient conditions of the theorems.
We then consider the opposite regime. More precisely, we study the influence that large
random deviations have on a perfect foresight equilibrium path associated with an unimodal map.
To obtain such description, we consider a large class of random dynamical systems obtained by
additive random perturbations of unimodal maps of the interval by sequences of independent
and identically distributed random variables. We provide conditions under which an ergodic
absolutely continuous invariant measure exists for such random dynamical systems. Furthermore,
under appropriate conditions we obtain a positive lower bound for the corresponding Lyapunov
exponent for almost every point of the interval.
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2.1 Stochastic Stability of Sunspot Equilibrium
In subsection 2.1.1, we briefly review the mathematical economics concepts and results that we
use throughout this chapter. In subsection 2.1.2, we revisit the concept of stationary sunspot
equilibria and the results of [1] on the existence of chaotic sunspots equilibria. Furthermore,
we define the dynamics that small ECF generate in a one-step forward looking economic model
and prove the main theorem relating that dynamics with the stationary measure of the chaotic
sunspot equilibrium or with a cycle. In subsection 2.1.3 we illustrate our main result using an
overlapping generations (OLG) model where the dynamics of ECF is close to either the stationary
measure of the SE or the deterministic cycle depending on the relative risk aversion of the agents.
In the final subsection 2.1.5 we present some well-known results on unimodal maps and small
random perturbations of those systems that we used in the previous section.
2.1.1 Chaotic Sunspot Equilibrium and Expectations Coordination Failures
In this section we briefly review concepts and results that will be of use throughout this chapter.
Sunspot Equilibria
Let X ⊆ Rn be the state variable set, B(X) denote the Borel subsets of X and P(X) be the set
of probability measures on B(X). We assume that the equilibria of the economy are given by the
zeroes of the function:
Z˜ : X × P(X)→ Rn ,
called stochastic excess demand function.
This nomenclature is due to the fact that in some economical models Z˜(x, µ) represents the
excess demand function associated with a current value x for the state variable and a probability
measure µ for the future value of the state variable. If Z˜(x, µ) = 0, the pair (x, µ) is called
a temporary equilibrium for the economy described by Z˜. In this case it is also said that µ
rationalizes x. We will assume that the following property holds for the stochastic excess demand
function Z˜.
For each x ∈ X, define the set of measures ρ(x) by
ρ(x) = {µ ∈ P(X)|Z˜(x, µ) = 0} .
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CVR (Convex valuedness of rationalizing measures) property: The stochastic excess demand
function Z˜ has the CVR property if for every x ∈ X and every family {µi}
k
i=1 ∈ ρ(x), we have
that
k∑
i=1
αiµi ∈ ρ(x) ,
where
∑k
i=1 αi = 1 and αi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Recall that a transition function defined on X is a function Q : X ×B(X)→ [0, 1] such that:
i) Q(x, ·) ∈ P(X) for every x ∈ X.
ii) Q(·, A) : X → [0, 1] is a measurable map for every A ∈ B(X)
We are now ready to define what is meant by sunspot equilibrium. See [14, 1] for further details.
Definition 2.1. A sunspot equilibrium (SE) is a pair (X0, Q) where X0 ⊂ X, and Q : X0 ×
B(X0)→ [0, 1] is a transition function such that:
i) there exists x0 ∈ X0 such that Q(x0, ·) is not a Dirac measure.
ii) Z˜(x,Q(x, ·)) = 0 for every x ∈ X0.
A sunspot equilibrium has the property that for each value of the state variable x ∈ X0, it is
assigned a conditional probability measure Q(x, ·) that rationalizes it, being truly stochastic for
at least one x0 ∈ X0.
Definition 2.2. A sunspot equilibrium (X0, Q) is said to be a stationary sunspot equilibrium
(SSE) if there exists a probability measure µ ∈ P(X) with support X0 such that the equality
µ(A) =
∫
X0
Q(x,A)µ(dx)
holds for every A ∈ B(X0).
We define the deterministic excess demand function Z : X ×X → Rn to be given by
Z(x0, x1) := Z˜(x0, δx1) ,
where δx1 denotes the Dirac measure supported at x1 ∈ X.
If x0 is the current value of the state variable and x1 is the expectation for sure of its future
value, the equation Z(x0, x1) = 0 is said to be a deterministic equilibrium condition and we say
that x1 deterministically rationalizes x0.
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Definition 2.3. A backward prefect foresight (bpf) map is a function φ : X → X such that
Z(φ(x), x) = 0 for all x ∈ X.
If the sequence {xt}t∈Z is such that xt = φ(xt+1) for all t ∈ Z, then Z(xt, xt+1) = Z(φ(xt+1), xt+1) =
0. This sequence is then a “bpf” equilibrium and occurs in economic models when the involved
agents exactly predict the future equilibrium value of the state variable.
The following theorem, due to Araujo and Maldonado [1], guarantees the existence of SSE
under general conditions on the corresponding bpf map and the stochastic excess demand function.
Theorem 2.1 (Araujo–Maldonado). Let φ : X → X be a bpf function associated with a stochastic
excess demand function Z˜ with the CVR property. Assume that the following properties hold:
(i) There exists a partition (Ai)
n
i=1 of X with non-empty interior such that φ : Ai → φ(Ai) is
a diffeomorphism for all i = 1, . . . , n with inverse ϕi.
(ii) There exists a φ-invariant measure µ ∈ P(X) such that µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure.
Then there exists a set C with positive Lebesgue measure such that the transition function
Q(x, ·) =
n∑
i=1
d(µ ◦ ϕi)
dµ
(x)δϕi(x)(.)
is a SSE on the set C with stationary measure µ. This SSE will be called a chaotic stationary
sunspot equilibrium.
From now on, we will specialize to the case where the state space X is a compact interval of R
and the state variable follows the perfect foresight path given by the one-dimensional dynamical
system
xt = φ(xt+1) ,
where φ is the bpf map associated with some deterministic excess demand function Z.
2.1.2 Stochastic perturbations of unimodal maps
Let X ⊆ R be a compact interval, φ : X → X be a backward perfect foresight map associated with
a stochastic excess demand function with the CVR property and let {xt}t∈Z be a perfect foresight
equilibrium for the model, i.e. the terms of the sequence {xt}t∈Z are such that xt = φ(xt+1) for
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every t ∈ Z. We say that a sequence {x˜t}t∈Z is a path with expectation coordination failures if
x˜t = φ(x˜t+1) + ǫt for all t ∈ Z, where {ǫt}t∈Z is a discrete time stochastic process such that
the random variables ǫt, t ∈ Z, are i.i.d. with distribution determined by some probability
density function θǫ with support [−ǫ, ǫ]. Small failures in coordination give rise to a perturbed
sequence which deviates slightly from the perfect foresight equilibrium sequence. The intuition
behind this definition is the following: given a (possible misperceived) future state value x˜t+1, the
current value for the state variable under perfect foresight is φ(x˜t+1); however the heterogeneity
of expectations introduces noise, leading to x˜t = φ(x˜t+1) + ǫt.
Our first goal is to show the stationarity of the process {x˜t}t≥0 and finally, to provide an
analysis of the convergence of the stationary measure as ǫ → 0. Let us assume that the pair
(φ, θǫ) satisfies the following technical conditions:
(H1) φ ∈ C3(X) is a unimodal map with non-flat critical point x∗ and negative Schwarzian
derivative.
(H2) there exist constants H0 ≥ 1, γ > 0 and 0 < α < γ/4 such that for every k ≥ H0 the
following inequalities hold:
i) |φk(x∗)− x∗| ≥ e−αk;
ii) |Dφk(φ(x∗))| ≥ eγk.
(H3) φ is topologically mixing in the dynamical interval bounded by φ(x∗) and φ2(x∗).
(H4) For small enough ǫ > 0, the probability density function θǫ : R→ R
+
0 is such that
(i) supp(θǫ) ⊂ Ωǫ = [−ǫ, ǫ],
(ii)
∫
Ωǫ
θǫ(y)dy = 1,
(iii) M = supǫ>0(ǫ sup |θǫ|) <∞,
(iv) Jǫ := {t| θǫ(t) > 0} is an interval containing 0 and ηǫ := log(θǫ|Jǫ) is a concave function.
The conditions above occur naturally in the one-dimensional dynamics literature. We provide
further comments and motivation in subSection 2.1.5.
Under conditions (H1)-(H4), a remarkable theorem due to Baladi and Viana [7] guarantees
that the map φ has an invariant measure with an integrable density, which is strongly stochasti-
cally stable. We will use such result to prove that small deviations from expectation coordination
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failures are stationary. Furthermore, the stationary probability distribution of the perturbed
process representing paths with expectation coordination failures is close to that of the chaotic
SE.
The transition function Pǫ associated to the path {x˜t}t∈Z with expectation coordination fail-
ures is given by
Pǫ(x,A) :=
∫
A−{φ(x)}
θǫ(t)dt =
∫
A
θǫ (y − φ(x)) dy ,
where x ∈ X and A ∈ B(X). This represents the probability of the current (misperceived) value
of the state variable being in A given that the expected value for the future state is x. Thus,
Pǫ(x,A) can be seen as the backward conditional probability induced by the ECF process.
A Borel probability measure νǫ on X is said to be stationary under the expectation coordi-
nation failures if
νǫ(A) =
∫
Pǫ(x,A)dν
ǫ(x) (2.1)
for all A ∈ B(X). The probability νǫ is the distribution of the misperceived future values of the
state variable that induces the same probability distribution for the current state variable values
under the small ECF.
We now notice that whenever an ergodic φ-invariant measure µ0 exists, we may use the bpf
map to estimate the invariant distribution. Using the Birkhoff ergodic theorem, we have that for
µ0-a.e. x ∈ X the sequence of measures
µ0N :=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
δφk(x)
converges to µ0 in the weak topology. Therefore, using the backward perfect foresight trajectory,
for µ0-almost every initial state x we obtain the histograms associated with the measure µ0N , as
we will describe now.
Let A = (Ai)
n
i=1 be a partition of X. Define the map P : X → A by P (x) = Ai if and only
if x ∈ Ai. Clearly, the map P is well defined for every x ∈ X. Moreover, we are able to define
µ0N (P (x)) by
µ0N (P (x)) =
♯{φk(x) ∈ P (x) : k ∈ {0, · · · , N − 1}}
N
.
Assume for the time being that the measure µ0 is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure λ. Denote its density by ρ0. Then, for µ0-a.e. x ∈ X we have that
ρ0,AN (x) :=
µ0N (P (x))
λ(P (x))
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is an estimate of the density (Radon-Nikodym derivative) of the invariant measure µ0 and as
N →∞ and the size of the partition converges to zero, we get the following convergence
ρ0,AN (x)→ ρ
0(x) .
Let us now consider the path with expectation coordination failure {x˜t}t∈Z, obtained from the
perfect foresight equilibrium sequence {xt}t∈Z through perturbation by the stationary discrete-
time process {ǫt}t∈Z described above, i.e. the terms of {x˜t}t∈Z are such that
x˜t = φ(x˜t+1) + ǫt . (2.2)
Assume that for every sufficiently small ǫ > 0, the stochastic process defined by (2.2) has a
unique ergodic absolutely continuous probability measure νǫ with density ρǫ. Thus, an estimate
of the measure νǫ can be defined by the asymptotic distribution of the Birkhoff average of Dirac
measures over the the path with expectations coordination failures {x˜t}t∈Z with x˜0 = x, i.e. the
measure
νǫN :=
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
δx˜−k (2.3)
converges to νǫ in the weak topology. Similarly to the deterministic dynamics, for every x ∈ X,
every partition A = (Ai)
n
i=1 of X and every small ǫ > 0, ν
ǫ
N (P (x)) is well defined by
νǫN (P (x)) =
♯{(φ + ǫk) ◦ · · · ◦ (φ+ ǫ1)(x) ∈ P (x) : k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}}
N
.
For νǫ-a.e. x ∈ X, we can estimate the density ρǫ of the measure νǫ by
ρǫ,AN (x) :=
νǫN (P (x))
λ(P (x))
.
Note that ρǫ,AN (x)→ ρ
ǫ(x) as N →∞ and the size of the partition converges to zero.
The following theorem guarantees that the stationary measure associated to the path with
expectations coordination failures (2.1) is close to the stationary measure under the chaotic
sunspot equilibrium.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that the stochastic excess demand function Z˜ satisfies the CVR property,
the associated bpf map φ : X → X satisfies conditions (H1)-(H3), and that the sequence of
expectations coordination failures (2.2) is obtained by perturbing the bpf dynamics by a sequence
of i.i.d. random perturbations {ǫj}j∈Z with density function satisfying (H4). Then, the following
statements hold:
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i) The approximate measure νǫN associated to the paths with expectations coordination failures
converges to the measure µ0 of the deterministic dynamics φ in the weak∗-topology, when
N →∞ and ǫ→ 0.
ii) The approximate density ρǫ,AN associated to the paths with expectations coordination failures
converges to the density ρ0 of φ in the norm topology, when N →∞ , ǫ→ 0 and for every
sequence of partitions A = (Ai)
n
i=1 such that max
i
|Ai| −→
n→∞
0.
Proof. We prove item (i) first. Let ǫ > 0 be small enough so that νǫ is the unique ergodic
probability measure of the sequence of expectation coordination failures in (2.2). Furthermore,
recall that for ǫ > 0 small enough, νǫ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. By the definition of the measure νǫN given in (2.3) and ergodicity of ν
ǫ, we have
that νǫN −→
N→∞
νǫ in the weak∗-topology. Under assumptions (H1)-(H3) and (H4), Baladi and
Viana Theorem 2.4 ensures that νǫ → µ0 in the weak∗-topology. Therefore, combining the two
statements above, we obtain that νǫN → µ
0 in the weak∗-topology when N →∞ and ǫ→ 0.
The proof of item (ii) is similar. By ergodicity of νǫ, we have that ρǫ,AN → ρ
ǫ in L1(dx) when
N →∞ and the size of the partition goes to zero. The result then follows by noting that Baladi
and Viana Theorem 2.4 also ensures that ρǫ → ρ0 in L1(dx) as ǫ→ 0.
One of the key consequence of Theorem 2.2 is that under mild conditions, the approximate
measures νǫN associated to the paths with expectations coordination failures approach the sta-
tionary measure µ0 of the SE given by Araujo and Maldonado [1] as ǫ → 0 and N → ∞. We
may call that process a Rational revealing of beliefs, i.e. as the number of iterations increases and
providing that the size of the perturbations ǫ is small enough, the agents gain knowledge about
the stationary measure µ0 from observing paths with expectation coordination failures.
Whenever the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 hold, then an absolutely continuous φ-invariant
measure µ0 exists, yielding a chaotic SE as in Araujo-Maldonado Theorem. In this case we say
that µ0 is a (full) spread of beliefs. The other case is for a bpf map φ with an attracting cycle, in
which case conditions (H2) and (H3) do not hold. We refer to such bpf maps as ordered backward
perfect foresight maps. For such maps a unique φ-invariant measure µ0 still exists. However,
µ0 is no longer absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Instead, µ0 is a
convex linear combination of Dirac masses with support on the attracting cycle. In such case,
we say that µ0 is a (full) concentration of beliefs. Due to hyperbolicity of the attracting cycle,
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the approximate measure µǫN associated with an ordered backward perfect foresight map defined
similarly to (2.3), converges to a measure µ0 with a (full) concentration of beliefs. Therefore,
the stationary process given by the small ECF converges either to the stationary measure of the
chaotic SE or to a deterministic cycle.
2.1.3 An application: an overlapping generations model
In this section we will consider a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model like the one
introduced in [27] and provide an application for our main results. An analogous model was
analysed by Azariadis and Guesnerie in [6] to prove the existence of cycles and sunspots with
finite support. We show that depending on the parameter values of the model, small ECF will
be either close to the stationary measure of the chaotic SE or close to a deterministic cycle.
Let us consider an OLG economy for a population with constant size and such that the
proportions of young and old agents remain unchanged over time. We assume that the there
exists a representative agent with preferences given by a separable utility function
U(ct, ct+1) = V1(ct) + V2(ct+1),
where V1 and V2 are the utilities representing the individual preferences with respect to the con-
sumption plan in the first and second periods of their lives, and ct, ct+1 denote the corresponding
consumption plan. We suppose also that one unit of the good is produced with one unit of the
unique productive factor (labor) and let l∗1 and l
∗
2 denote the agents labor endowments in the first
and second periods of their lives, respectively. Finally, we assume that there is a risk-free asset
that can be purchased by the agents providing a gross return zt = 1 + rt > 1, where rt is the
interest rate at period t, and that the dynamics of the money supply is defined by
Mt+1 =Mtzt+1 ,
for some initial condition M0.
We impose the following additional conditions on the utility function:
(C1) For each τ = 1, 2 , Vτ is continuous on [0,+∞) and (at least) twice continuously differen-
tiable on (0,+∞). Moreover, Vτ is strictly increasing and strictly concave and satisfies
lim
cτ→+∞
V ′τ (cτ ) = 0 , lim
cτ→0
V ′τ (cτ ) = +∞ , Θ¯ :=
V ′1(l
∗
1)
V ′2(l
∗
2)
< 1 .
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(C2) The Arrow-Pratt relative degree of risk aversion of the old, given by
RV2(x) = −
xV ′′2 (x)
V ′2(x)
,
is a non-decreasing function of x.
See [27] and the references therein for further comments and motivations for hypotheses (C1)-
(C2).
We will now state the consumption-saving problem of the representative agent. Let pt and
pt+1 denote the prices of the unique good in the economy during the first and second periods of
the individual’s life. Note that while pt is known by the individual during the first stage of her
life, her knowledge concerning pt+1 consists of a probability distribution µt+1 representing the
likelihood of occurrence of particular values of pt+1 and reflecting the individual’s beliefs about
the state of economy during the second period of her life. The agent must choose a consumption
plan ct, ct+1 and the first period saving mt as the solution of the following optimization problem
max
{ct,ct+1,mt}
V1(ct) + Eµt+1
[
V2(ct+1)
]
(2.4)
subject to the budget constraints
ptct +mt = ptl
∗
1
pt+1ct+1 = pt+1l
∗
2 + ztmt .
Working out the first order condition for an interior solution of (2.4) leads to
−
1
pt
V ′1
(
l∗1 −
mt
pt
)
+ Eµt+1
[
zt
pt+1
V ′2
(
l∗2 +
ztmt
pt+1
)]
= 0 . (2.5)
Monetary equilibrium condition and the bpf dynamics
Under the monetary equilibrium condition Mt = m, and introducing the new variable
xt =
Mt
pt
,
the first order condition (2.5), may be rewritten as
ν1(xt) = Eµt+1 [ν2(xt+1)] , (2.6)
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where ν1 and ν2 are the the auxiliary functions defined by
ν1(x) = xV
′
1(l
∗
1 − x) , ν2(x) = xV
′
2(l
∗
2 + x) , (2.7)
Note that condition (2.6) defines the following stochastic excess demand function
Z˜(x, µ) = ν1(x)− Eµ
[
ν2(x
′)
]
and that Z˜ has the CVR property introduced in Section 2.1.1. The deterministic excess demand
function associated with Z˜ is then given by
Z(x, x′) = Z˜(x, δx′) = ν1(x)− ν2(x
′) ,
defining the associated bpf map through the implicit relation
Z(φ(x), x) = 0 .
Under condition (C1), it is possible to check that the map ν1 defined in (2.7) is strictly increasing,
and thus invertible. Hence, we obtain that the backward perfect foresight map is of the form
φ(x) = ν−11 (ν2(x)) , (2.8)
and the corresponding bpf dynamical system is determined by
xt = φ(xt+1) = ν
−1
1 (ν2(xt+1))
Grandmont [27] provided conditions under which the bpf map in (2.8) is unimodal with non-
flat critical point and negative Schwarzian derivative, i.e. satisfies condition (H1) of Section 2.1.5.
For the sake of completeness, we reproduce their criteria in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.1. If conditions (C1) and (C2) hold and there exists x0 ≥ 0 such that RV2(x0) > 1,
then the bpf map φ is a unimodal map with φ(0) = 0 and φ′(0) > 1. Moreover, if Vτ ∈ C
3 for
τ = 1, 2, Sν1 ≥ 0 on [0, l
∗
1), Sν2 < 0 on [0, φ(x
∗)) and supRV2(x) > 1 then φ ∈ C.
Now, let us consider the bpf map defined by (2.8) and parameterized by one of the parameters
of the model (e.g. the relative risk aversion coefficient). In the Appendix we provide some
technical features to be dealt with below. Thus, let φλ : X → X, λ ∈ Λ ⊂ R, be the one-
parameter family of bpf maps (2.8) with the property that the conditions of Lemma 2.1 hold for
every λ ∈ Λ. Then, for every λ ∈ Λ, we have that
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i) φλ is a C
2 unimodal maps of an interval X;
ii) φλ has a nondegenerate critical point x¯(λ);
iii) φλ has a repelling fixed point on the boundary of X.
We say that the one-parameter family φλ, λ ∈ Λ, has a Misiurewicz parameter with generic
unfolding if the following conditions hold
a) the map (x, λ)→
(
φλ(x),Dxφλ(x),D
2
xφλ(x)
)
is C1;
b) there exists a parameter value λ∗ ∈ Λ such that φλ∗ is a Misiurewicz map;
c) the following transversality condition holds:
lim
n→+∞
Dλφ
n
λ∗
(x¯(λ∗))
Dxφ
n−1
λ∗
(φλ∗(x¯(λ∗)))
6= 0 .
Note that condition a) only depends on the choice of a sufficiently regular parametrization for
such family of bpf maps. In what concerns conditions b) and c), we remark that in the case
where φλ∗ is a post-critically finite Misiurewicz map, i.e. φλ∗ has no periodic attractors and some
iterate N of the critical point x¯(λ∗) reaches a repelling periodic point P (λ∗), then condition c) is
equivalent to the transversality of the curves λ 7→ φNλ (x¯(λ)) and λ 7→ P (λ).
The next result provides a set of conditions under which there exists a large set of bpf maps
for which a strongly stochastically stable SSE exists.
Theorem 2.3. Let φλ : X → X, λ ∈ Λ ⊂ R, be a one-parameter family of bpf maps (2.8) with
the property that the conditions of Lemma 2.1 hold for every λ ∈ Λ. Moreover, assume that φλ
has a Misiurewicz parameter λ∗ ∈ Λ with generic unfolding. Then, there exists a positive measure
set A ⊂ Λ having λ∗ as a density point such that for every λ ∈ A there exists a SSE whose
invariant measure µλ is an absolutely continuous SBR measure. Moreover, if the bpf dynamics
are perturbed by an i.i.d process satisfying (H4), φλ is strongly stochastically stable.
Proof. For one-parameter families of maps satisfying the conditions i), ii) and iii) above and
having a Misiurewicz parameter λ∗ ∈ Λ with generic unfolding, there exists a positive measure
set A in the space of parameters with λ∗ as a density point and such that condition (H2) holds
for every λ ∈ A (see [16] for further details). As a consequence, for every λ ∈ A, we have that
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1) φλ admits an acip µλ, with a L
p density for any p < 2;
2) µλ is a SBR measure;
3) φλ has positive Lyapunov exponent almost everywhere.
Hence, Theorem 2.1 ensures the existence of a SSE associated with each measure µλ ∈ A. The
strong stochastic stability of φλ follows from Theorem 2.4 by observing that condition (H3) holds
for unimodal maps with negative Schwartzian derivative and an acip.
We remark that there may be parameters outside of the set A of Theorem 2.3 yielding a
strongly stochastically stable SSE. In the alternative case where the bpf map φ is an ordered
bpf map (see section 2.2), then φ has an attracting cycle leading a measure µ0 revealing a (full)
concentration of beliefs.
The case of constant relative risk aversion utilities
Let us consider now the case of constant relative risk aversion utility functions of the form
Vτ (c) =
c1−ατ
1− ατ
; ατ > 0 , τ = 1, 2 , (2.9)
where α1 and α2 are, respectively, the relative degrees of risk aversion for the representative agent
in the first and second periods of her life. It is possible to check that the bpf map associated with
the choice of utilities (2.9) is such that φ ∈ C if the relative risk aversion parameters are such
that α1 ∈ (0, 1) and α2 ∈ (2,+∞) (see [1] for further details).
To illustrate the large abundance of strongly stochastically stable SSE for this particular
family of utility functions, we numerically determine values of parameters (α1, α2, l
∗
1, l
∗
2) under
which the bpf map φ is a post-critically finite Misiurewicz map, i.e. φ has no periodic attractors
and the critical orbit is pre-periodic to a repelling periodic orbit. Note that these are a subset
of the set of Misiurewicz maps. To simplify the analysis, we fix the parameters l∗1 = 3.51 and
l∗2 = 0.55 and work only on the two parameter space (α1, α2) ∈ (0, 1) × (2,+∞). We then
numerically compute any intersections between the first N iterates of the critical point and the
periodic points up to some finite period M , excluding all the non-transverse intersections and all
the intersections with attracting periodic points. Note that if the critical point is pre-periodic to
a repelling periodic point, then there are no stable or neutral cycles, since for unimodal maps with
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negative Schwarzian these would attract the critical orbit. In Figure 2.1 it is possible to notice the
different dynamical behaviours of the bpf map as the risk aversion parameter α2 increases from 2
to 7.5. For small values of α2, there exists a unique attracting fixed point of φ. As α2 increases,
periodic points of higher periods are generated by period-doubling bifurcations. All such maps φ
are ordered bpf maps and lead to (full) concentration of beliefs, i.e. invariant measures supported
on convex linear combination of Dirac measures. For some large enough values of α2 Misiurewicz
maps can be found. See Figure 2.2 for the distribution of Misiurewicz maps in parameter space
(α2, α1) ∈ (2, 7.5) × (0.01, 0.29). As noted above, the values of parameters under which such
maps occur are density points of positive measure sets where chaotic SSE exist and are robust
with respect to sufficiently small stochastic perturbations. Such parameters are associated with
invariant measures with a (full) spread of beliefs. Ultimately, one obtains a dichotomy between
the subset of parameter space corresponding to (full) spread of beliefs and (full) concentration of
beliefs.
To make the distinction between the behaviours associated with (full) spread of beliefs and
(full) concentration of beliefs clear, we plot in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 some histograms associated
with 105 iterations of paths with coordination failures for two different set of parameters values.
Figure 2.3 corresponds to a chaotic of parameters revealing a (full) spread of beliefs, i.e. a chaotic
SE exists. Moreover, when perturbing the bpf map by a sequence of i.i.d. random variables
satisfying assumption (H4), we see that the corresponding histograms are associated with an
absolutely continuous measure. Instead, for the parameter values used to produce Figure 2.4,
no chaotic SE exists. In this case, we observe a full concentration of beliefs with a stationary
measure supported on a period two orbit.
2.1.4 Conclusions
We have considered small random perturbations of backward perfect foresight maps within a class
of unimodal maps with non-flat critical point and negative Schwarzian that satisfy the Benedicks-
Carleson conditions. In that setting we proved the stationarity of the time series generated by
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Figure 2.1: The first 100 iterates of critical point (in blue) and periodic points (up to period 8) of
the bpf map φ in the (α2, x) plane. We plot the stable periodic points in green and the unstable
ones in red. Figure 2.1a contains only the fixed point of φ, Figure 2.1b contains the fixed point
and the period 2 orbit, Figure 2.1c contains periodic points of periods 1, 2 and 4, and finally,
Figure 2.1d contains all periodic points whose period divides 8. The remaining parameters are
fixed and equal to l∗1 = 3.51, l
∗
2 = 0.55 and α1 = 0.41.
small expectations coordination failures as well as its closeness to the stationary measure of the
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Figure 2.2: The distribution of Misiurewicz parameters for the family of bpf maps with (α2, α1) ∈
(2, 7.5) × (0.01, 0.99) for fixed l∗1 = 3.51 and l
∗
2 = 0.55. These are obtained by considering
intersections of the first 100 iterates of the critical point with unstable periodic points of periods
1, 2, 4 and 8.
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Figure 2.3: Map φ and the approximate densities of the dynamics of the bpf map xt = φ(xt+1)
with parameters l∗1 = 3.5, l
∗
2 = 0.55, α1 = 0.2, α2 = 6.5 under perturbations of maximum size
(a) ǫ = 0.01, (b) ǫ = 0.001, (c) ǫ = 0, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Map φ and the approximate densities of the dynamics of the bpf map xt = φ(xt+1)
with parameters l∗1 = 3.5, l
∗
2 = 0.6, α1 = 0.2, α2 = 5 under perturbations of maximum size
(a) ǫ = 0.1, (b) ǫ = 0.01, (d) ǫ = 0 respectively.
chaotic SE. As a consequence, small expectations coordination failures will converge to one of two
equilibria: to the chaotic sunspot equilibrium defined by [1] or to a deterministic cycle. Finally, as
an application we studied an overlapping generations model and showed that a large class of OLG
models has unimodal bpf maps associated with its stochastic excess demand function. This family
of unimodal bpf maps satisfies condition (H1) and for a subset of positive Lebesgue measure in
parameter space, this family has an absolutely continuous invariant measure associated with the
SSE.
2.1.5 Dynamics of unimodal maps
The aim of this subsection is to introduce the nomenclature and some of the key results from
one-dimensional dynamics used throughout, as well as to provide appropriate motivation for such
concepts and results.
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Deterministic unimodal maps
Let X = [a, b] ⊂ R be a compact interval. A continuous map φ : X → X is called unimodal if φ
has a unique interior local maximum at x∗ such that φ is strictly increasing in [a, x∗) and strictly
decreasing in (x∗, b]. It is also common to require that φ(∂X) ⊂ ∂X, but we will not do so here.
However, if such condition is required, we note that any endomorphism of a compact interval can
be extended to a bigger interval so that the boundary of the larger interval is mapped into itself.
The local maximum of φ at c will be called non-flat if there exists a C2 local diffeomorphism
h such that h(c) = 0 and φ(x) = φ(c)±|h(x)|α , for some α ≥ 2. A notable example of a unimodal
map is the quadratic family fλ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined by fλ(x) = λx(1− x), for λ ∈ (0, 4].
The Schwarzian derivative of a C3 map φ is defined by
Sφ(x) =
φ′′′(x)
φ′(x)
−
3
2
(
φ′′(x)
φ′(x)
)2
for every x ∈ X such that φ′(x) 6= 0. Throughout this section, we will consider the following set
of unimodal maps of the compact interval X:
C = {φ ∈ C3(X) : φ has a non-flat critical point and Sφ < 0} .
Let µ be a φ-invariant measure, i.e. µ(φ−1(A)) = µ(A) for every measurable set A ⊂ X. We
say that µ is a SBR measure (Sinai-Bowen-Ruelle measure) if there exists a set B ⊂ X with
positive Lebesgue measure such that
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
δφk(x) −→
N→∞
µ
for all x ∈ B, where the limit is taken in the weak∗-topology sense. There is a vast literature
concerning the existence and uniqueness of absolutely continuous invariant measures for unimodal
maps. In what follows, we provide only a quick overview of some results that will be useful in the
sequel. See for instance [16, Chp. 5], as well as Blokh and Lyubich [10], Keller [31] and Nowicki
and van Strien [38] for more details.
We start by a result due to Keller: if φ ∈ C there exists a constant λφ ∈ R, called the Lyapunov
exponent, such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Dφn(x)| = λφ.
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for almost all x ∈ X. Moreover, we have that λφ > 0 if and only if φ has an absolutely continuous
invariant probability measure (acip); and λφ < 0 if and only if φ has a hyperbolic periodic
attractor.
Benedicks and Carleson [8] provide the following sufficient conditions for the existence of an
acip µ for a unimodal map φ:
(H1) φ ∈ C;
(H2) there exist constants H0 ≥ 1, γ > 0 and 0 < α < γ/4 such that for every k ≥ H0 the
following inequalities hold:
i) |φk(x∗)− x∗| ≥ e−αk;
ii) |Dφk(φ(x∗))| ≥ eγk.
(H3) φ is topologically mixing in the dynamical interval bounded by φ(x∗) and φ2(x∗).
We notice that condition (H1) is very mild and that it is satisfied by a large family of unimodal
maps. Before discussing condition (H2), we introduce a special class of unimodal maps admitting
an acip under mild nonflatness conditions [37]. A unimodal map φ : X → X is called aMisiurewicz
map if it has no periodic attractors and if critical orbits do not accumulate on critical points.
A post-critically finite Misiurewicz map is a Misiurewicz map for which the critical orbit is pre-
periodic to a repelling periodic orbit. Indeed, note that item i) of condition (H2) above is trivially
satisfied by Misiurewicz maps. Let us now provide the connection between item ii) of (H2) and
Misiurewicz maps. Let φλ : X → X, λ ∈ Λ ⊆ R, be a one-parameter family of unimodal maps
φ ∈ C passing through one Misiurewicz point with generic unfolding, i.e. the following conditions
hold
a) the map (x, λ)→
(
φλ(x),Dxφλ(x),D
2
xφλ(x)
)
is C1;
b) there exists a parameter value λ∗ ∈ Λ such that φλ∗ is a Misiurewicz map;
c) the following transversality condition holds:
lim
n→+∞
Dλφ
n
λ∗
(x¯(λ∗))
Dxφ
n−1
λ∗
(φλ∗(x¯(λ∗)))
6= 0 .
25
In spite of the set of Misiurewicz parameters having zero Lebesgue measure in the parameter space
of the maps φλ, there exists a positive measure set in that space with a Misiurewicz parameter
as a density point and where conditions i) and ii) of (H2) are satisfied (see [49]) and therefore the
existence of acips for our maps is guaranteed. Finally, we remark that assumption (H3) always
holds for unimodal maps with negative Schwartzian derivative and an acip.
Stochastic Perturbations of unimodal maps
Consider the Markov chain χǫ generated by perturbations of the deterministic map φ : X → X
by a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables {ǫj}j≥1 with
density function θǫ. Assume that the following condition holds:
(H4) For small enough ǫ > 0, the probability density function θǫ : R→ R
+
0 is such that
(i) supp(θǫ) ⊂ Ωǫ = [−ǫ, ǫ],
(ii)
∫
Ωǫ
θǫ(y)dy = 1,
(iii) M = supǫ>0(ǫ sup |θǫ|) <∞,
(iv) Jǫ := {t| θǫ(t) > 0} is an interval containing 0 and ηǫ := log(θǫ|Jǫ) is a concave function.
Identify ΩNǫ = [−ǫ, ǫ]
N with {Φǫ = (φ + ǫ1, φ + ǫ2, · · · ) : ǫi ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ]} and define the cocycle
F : X × ΩNǫ → X × Ω
N
ǫ by
F(x,Φǫ) := (φ(x) + ǫ1, σ(Φǫ)) ,
where σ : ΩNǫ → Ω
N
ǫ is the shift operator, i.e. σ(a1, a2, · · · ) = (a2, a3, · · · ) for any sequence
(a1, a2, · · · ) ∈ Ω
N
ǫ . The cocycle F defines the random dynamics
χǫ(x) = φ(x) + ǫ . (2.10)
For every x0 ∈ X, we define the ǫ-random orbit of x0 to be the sequence {x˜k}k≥0 given by
x˜k := (φ+ ǫk) ◦ · · · ◦ (φ+ ǫ1)(x0) , k ≥ 1 .
The transition function Pǫ associated with χ
ǫ is given by
Pǫ(x,A) :=
∫
A
θǫ (y − φ(x)) dy ,
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where x ∈ X and A ∈ B(X). A Borel probability measure νǫ on X is said to be stationary under
the Markov chain χǫ if
νǫ(A) =
∫
Pǫ(x,A)dν
ǫ(x)
for all A ∈ B(X).
It is known that for every small enough ǫ > 0, there exists a unique ergodic probability
measure νǫ which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and stationary
under χǫ (see [7] for more details).
Let φ ∈ C be such that µ0 is its unique invariant absolutely continuous probability measure.
Denote the density of µ0 by ρ0. We say that φ is strongly stochastically stable under ǫ-random
perturbations if νǫ → µ0 in the norm topology as ǫ→ 0, i.e.
lim
ǫ→0
∥∥∥∥dµǫdλ − dµ
0
dλ
∥∥∥∥
L1(dλ)
= 0 .
Baladi and Viana [7] provide a set of sufficient conditions for the strong stochastic stability
of unimodal maps. Let φ : X → X be such that conditions (H1)-(H3) hold. Moreover, let χǫ be
the Markov chain generated by random perturbations of φ by i.i.d. random variables satisfying
(H4).
Theorem 2.4 (Baladi-Viana). Under conditions (H1)-(H4), φ has an invariant measure with an
integrable density, which is strongly stochastically stable
Taking into consideration the observation before assumption (H4), in this subsection concern-
ing assumptions (H1)-(H3), we obtain that for one-parameter families of unimodal maps φ ∈ C
passing through one Misiurewicz point with generic unfolding, Baladi and Viana theorem applies
to a set of positive measure in parameter space.
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2.2 Large random perturbations of Sunspot Equilibrium
This section is devoted to study how large additive random perturbations influence the dynamics
of unimodal maps in what concerns the existence of ergodic and absolutely continuous stationary
measures for the corresponding random dynamical systems as well as positivity of the Lyapunov
exponent. In subsection 2.2.1 we state the setup and necessary background. In subsection 2.2.2 we
discuss the existence of a stochastic dynamical interval for the random dynamical system defined
by the large perturbations of the deterministic dynamics. In subsection 2.2.3 we state conditions
under which the random dynamical system admits a unique invariant measure which is both
ergodic and equivalent to the Lebesgue measure. In subsection 2.2.4 we prove the existence of a
positive lower bound for the Lyapunov exponent of a random dynamical system under appropriate
conditions. Finally, in subsection 2.2.5 we illustrate the results of this section with the well-known
overlapping generations model presented previously in subsection 2.1.3.
2.2.1 Setup and Background
Let X = R be the state variable set and let B(X) denote the Borel σ-algebra of X. Throughout
this section we will assume that φ : X → X is such that the following conditions hold:
Assumption (A):
1) φ is C2 in supp(φ).
2) φ(0) = 0.
3) φ′(0) > 1.
4) There exists a unique x∗ > 0 such that φ′(x∗) = 0.
5) φ′′(x∗) 6= 0 and if there exists x˜ such that φ′′(x˜) = 0, then x˜ > x∗.
6) limx→+∞ φ(x) = 0.
7) limx→+∞ φ
′(x) = 0.
Assumption (A) ensures that we deal with a family of unimodal maps with a non-degenerate
critical point x∗ and a repelling fixed point at zero. Indeed, we will consider two distinct cases
herein. The case where supp φ is a compact subset of X of the form [0, b], with b > 0, and the
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case where supp φ = R+. We also note that if there exists x¯ > 0 such that for every x > x¯ we
have φ(x) = 0, then hypotheses 6) and 7) hold trivially.
Fix ǫ > 0, let Ωǫ = [−ǫ, ǫ] and denote by ηǫ the uniform probability measure on Ωǫ. We
will consider random dynamical systems (RDS) (see [5] for further details) obtained through
perturbations of the (deterministic) dynamical system defined by a unimodal map φ satisfying
assumption (A) by sequences of i.i.d. random variables with distribution ηǫ. Elements of such
class of RDS are conveniently expressed through cocycles φǫ of the deterministic dynamical system
(X,φ) over the probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = ΩNǫ , F is a σ-algebra on Ω and P is the
product measure induced on Ω by the measure ηǫ on Ωǫ. Thus, each state of the world ω ∈ Ω
corresponds to a sequence ω = (ω1, ω2, · · · ) and the cocycle φǫ : X ×Ω→ X is such that
φǫ(x, ω) = φ(x) + π1(σ(ω)) , (2.11)
where σ : Ω→ Ω is the shift map and π1 : Ω→ Ωǫ is the projection onto the first component, i.e.
for every sequence (ω1, ω2, ω3, · · · ) ∈ Ω, we have that
π1(ω1, ω2, ω3, · · · ) = ω1 .
We can associate with the cocycle φǫ above the skew-product Θǫ : X × Ω→ X × Ω given by
Θǫ(x, ω) = (φǫ(x, ω), σ(ω)) .
Note that the skew-product above defines a dynamical system on Ω×X. Thus, each element ω ∈
Ω, can be seen as a sequence of i.i.d. ηǫ random variables representing the additive perturbations
to which φ is subject to in each iteration. In particular, the orbit of the RDS induced by φǫ
associated with the sequence ω = {ωn}n∈N can be expressed as
x˜n = φ(x˜n−1) + ωn , (2.12)
where x˜0 = x0 ∈ X.
Recall that under assumption (A), the unimodal map φ has a non-empty invariant (deter-
ministic) dynamical interval Λ, given by
Λ = [φ2(x∗), φ(x∗)] .
Note that Λ is the smallest invariant interval under φ that contains the critical point x∗. Note
also that the dynamics of φ agree with those of the limiting case φ0, corresponding to zero size
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random perturbations. Similarly, we will say that Γ ⊆ supp φ is a stochastic dynamical interval if
the dynamical interval Λ associated with φ is such that Λ ⊆ Γ and, additionally, Γ is the smallest
P-a.s. invariant interval under the RDS defined by φǫ. In the sequel we will provide conditions
guaranteeing the existence of such a stochastic dynamical interval (see Lemma 2.1).
A probability measure µ˜ on X ×Ω is invariant under the random dynamical system φǫ if the
following two conditions hold
1. Θµ˜ = µ˜,
2. πΩµ˜ = P,
where πΩµ˜ denotes the marginal of µ˜ on (Ω,F). Let ψǫ : X × Ωǫ → X be the map given by
ψǫ(x, y) = φ(x) + y .
A Borel probability measure µ on X is invariant for the random map ψǫ if
µ(A) =
∫
Ωǫ
µ
(
ψ−1ǫ (A)
)
dηǫ(y) ,
for every Borel set A ⊆ X.
Let A∆B denote the symmetric difference (A\B)∪ (B\A). We say that an invariant measure
µ on X is ergodic if µ(A∆ψ−1ǫ (A)) = 0, for ηǫ a.e. y ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], implies that µ(A) is either 0 or 1.
The Lyapunov exponent of the RDS induced by φǫ is given by
λ(ω, x) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
ln |φ′(x˜k)| ,
where x˜k is a sequence of the form (2.12). By Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem, the Lyapunov exponent
λ(ω, x) exists µ × P a.s., provided µ is invariant for the random map ψǫ. Moreover, if µ is also
ergodic, then λ(ω, x) is µ× P a.s. equal to the the constant
λ =
∫
X
ln |φ′(x)|dµ(x) .
In what follows, we will find mild conditions under which the RDS defined by the action of
the cocycle φǫ has an ergodic invariant measure with a positive Lyapunov exponent for almost
every point of its dynamical interval Γ.
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2.2.2 Stochastic dynamical interval
In this section we will discuss the existence of a stochastic dynamical interval for the random
dynamics defined by the cocycle φǫ.
Lemma 2.2. There exists ǫmax > 0 such that for every ǫ ∈ [0, ǫmax], the RDS induced by the
cocycle φǫ has a stochastic dynamical interval Γ ⊂ R
+.
Proof. Since the dynamical interval associated with the unimodal map φ is given by Λ = [φ2(x∗), φ(x∗)],
we obtain that the right most point of the stochastic dynamical interval Γ is
xR = φ(x
∗) + ǫ .
We now note that xR is mapped into φ(φ(x
∗) + ǫ) by the map φ. Thus, a candidate for the left
most point of Γ turns out to be
xL = φ(φ(x
∗) + ǫ)− ǫ .
Hence, for the set
Γ = [φ(φ(x∗) + ǫ)− ǫ, φ(x∗) + ǫ]
to be invariant under the random dynamics defined by φǫ, it is enough to check that
φ(φ(φ(x∗) + ǫ)− ǫ) > φ(φ(x∗) + ǫ) . (2.13)
Note that if ǫ = 0, the condition above reduces to φ3(x∗) > φ2(x∗), which always holds since the
deterministic dynamical interval Λ = [φ2(x∗), φ(x∗)] is invariant under the dynamics of φ.
Since φ is a C2 function (in supp φ) by assumption (A), then by the implicit function theorem
we obtain that there exists ǫ∗ > 0 such that
φ(φ(φ(x∗) + ǫ∗)− ǫ∗) = φ(φ(x∗) + ǫ∗) .
In particular, for every 0 < ǫ < ǫ∗ we have that condition (2.13) holds.
The result follows from taking
ǫmax = min{φ
2(x∗), b− φ(x∗), ǫ∗} ,
where b− φ(x∗) is identified with +∞ in the case where supp φ = R+.
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Remark 2.1. In the case where ǫ > ǫmax, there may be orbits of the RDS induced by the cocycle φǫ
that leave the stochastic dynamical interval Γ of the previous lemma with strictly positive probabil-
ity. Such orbits are captured by the point x = 0 in the boundary of supp φ with positive probability.
Moreover, if φ has an (absolutely continuous) SRB measure with support Λ = [φ2(x∗), φ(x∗)], then
for Lebesgue almost every point x0 ∈ Λ, the orbit of x0 by the RDS induced by φǫ is captured by
x = 0 with full probability.
2.2.3 Ergodic measure
For a given ǫ > 0, denote the closed ǫ-neighborhood of a set A ∈ B(X) by Bǫ(A) = {x ∈ X :
dist(x,A) ≤ ǫ}. From this point onwards, we will assume that ǫ > 0 is such that a stochastic
dynamic interval Γ exists for the RDS defined by φǫ. For any x ∈ Γ and A ∈ B(Γ), let
p(x,A) =
1
2ǫ
m(A ∩Bǫ(φ(x))) (2.14)
be the transition probability representing the likelihood of a point x ∈ Γ to be mapped onto a set
A ∈ B(Γ) by the random dynamical system induced by φǫ. We call p(x,A) the transition kernel.
A probability measure µ ∈ P(Γ) is said to be stationary under the Markov process associated
with φǫ if
µ(A) =
∫
Γ
p(x,A) dµ(x) (2.15)
for every A ∈ B(Γ). We note that a stationary measure as defined above is invariant in average
over randomly perturbed orbits. In particular, a stationary measure for the Markov chain induced
by the dynamics of φǫ is an invariant measure for the corresponding random map ψǫ. Additionally,
a φǫ invariant measure µ˜ = µ×P is ergodic if and only if µ is ergodic (see the monographs [5, 32]
for further details).
Lemma 2.3. Let φ be such that assumption (A) holds, then for every 0 < ǫ < ǫmax the RDS
induced by φǫ admits a stationary measure µ that is absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure.
Proof. Since for every x ∈ Γ and every A ∈ B(Γ) the transition kernel p(x,A) is a continuous
function of both variables and the map x 7→ p(x,A) is continuous, a stationary measure µ is
guaranteed to exist [32]. Moreover, any stationary measure µ is absolutely continuous with
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respect to the Lebesgue measure m, µ << m, since for any ǫ > 0 we have that
µ(A) ≤ max
x∈Γ
p(x,A) ≤
1
2ǫ
m(A) .
Therefore, there exists a density function ρ such that
µ(A) =
∫
A
ρ(x) dm(x) , (2.16)
concluding the proof.
The following theorem provides conditions guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of an
invariant ergodic measure µ on Γ for the RDS induced by φǫ. Its proof uses the strategy developed
in [34] by Lian and Stenlund, extending it to the setup under consideration here. Before providing
its statement, let us introduce the following notation:
Sφ,K = {x ∈ Λ : |φ
′(x)| < K} ,
where Λ denotes the (deterministic) dynamical interval of φ.
Theorem 2.5. Let φ be such that assumption (A) holds and let ǫmax be as given in Lemma 2.2.
If m(Sφ,2) < 2ǫmax, then for every ǫ such that m(Sφ,2)/2 < ǫ < ǫmax, the random dynamical
system induced by φǫ admits a unique invariant measure which is both ergodic and equivalent to
the Lebesgue measure m on Γ.
Proof. According to Lemma 2.3, we know that there exists a stationary measure with support
equal to Γ for the ǫ-perturbed system defined by φǫ. Moreover, such measure is invariant and
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Γ. Also, if there exists an ergodic
stationary measure which is equivalent to the Lebesgue measure, it is unique. Hence, we only
need to prove that the absolutely continuous invariant measure µ is equivalent to m and ergodic.
For Lebesgue almost every point x ∈ suppµ, since dµ = ρ dm is stationary, we have that
µ(suppµ) =
∫
Γ
p(x, suppµ) dµ(x) =
∫
suppµ
p(x, suppµ)ρ(x) dm(x) .
Moreover, identity (2.16) implies that
µ(suppµ) =
∫
suppµ
ρ(x) dm(x) .
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Hence, we obtain that ∫
suppµ
(1− p(x, suppµ))ρ(x) dm(x) = 0
and thus
p(x, suppµ) = 1 .
Since µ << m, we get that m(suppµ) > 0. To prove ergodicity, for any set A ∈ B(Γ) invariant
mod µ with µ(A) > 0 we need to check that µ(A) = 1. Since µ << m, it is sufficient to show
that m(A) = m(Γ). Since suppµ is an invariant subset of Γ mod µ, we assume without loss of
generality that A ⊂ suppµ.
The rest of this proof is divided into the following two steps:
(1) For every k ≥ 0, consider the sequence Ik+1 = Bǫ(φ(Ik)), where I0 = Bǫ(φ(x)) and x ∈ A.
Then, we have m(Ik\A) = 0.
(2) There exist n > 0 and ǫ0 > 0 such that for every ǫ0 < ǫ < ǫmax and every k > n, we have
Ik = Γ
Hence, by proving the two statements above, we conclude that an ergodic measure exists for the
RDS defined by φǫ. Moreover, we also obtain that the probability measure µ is equivalent to the
Lebesgue measure m on Γ.
1. By considering A ⊂ suppµ, the statements µ-a.e. and m-a.e. are equivalent. Since A is
assumed to be invariant, then for a.e. x ∈ A we have that p(x,A) = 1. Pick such an x. Thus, by
defining the interval I0 = Bǫ(φ(x)) we have m(I0\A) = 0, because
p(x,A) =
1
2ǫ
m (A ∩Bǫ(φ(x))) = 1 ,
by invariance of A. Also, since A ⊂ suppµ and m(A ∩ I0) = 2ǫ, by absolute continuity of µ with
respect to m we conclude that µ(A ∩ I0) > 0. By invariance of A, we also have that p(y,A) = 1
for a.e. y ∈ A ∩ I0. Denote the set of such y by I˜0. Then I0 = I˜0 ∪N0 for some m-null set N0.
Also for any k ≥ 1, we define Ik = Bǫ(φ(Ik−1)) and
I˜k = {y ∈ Ik ∩A : p(y,A) = 1} ⊂ A
inductively. Then by induction we obtain that Ik = I˜k∪Nk for somem-null set Nk. Note also that
Ik contains a countable dense set, which we will denote by Iˆk. Since Ik and Ik−1 = I˜k−1 ∪Ni−1
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are closed intervals and by induction m(Nk−1) = 0, then
Ik =
⋃
y∈Iˆk−1
Bǫ(φ(y)) ∪ ∂Ik ,
where ∂Ik denote the boundary of Ik. Also, for each y ∈ I˜k−1 we have p(y,A) = 1, which from
(2.14) implies
m(Bǫ(φ(y))\A) = 0 .
Since Iˆk−1 is countable, we conclude thatm(Ik\A) = 0. Moreover, we also obtain thatm(Ik\I˜k) =
0 by invariance of A.
2. Note that for any K > 2, if ǫ is such that Km(Sφ,K)/4 < ǫ < ǫmax, then for any interval
I ⊂ Γ, we have that
m (Bǫ(φ(I))) ≥ min{m(Γ), 2ǫ +m (φ(I ∩ (Sφ,K)
c))}
≥ min{m(Γ), 2ǫ +
K
2
m (I ∩ (Sφ,K)
c)}
≥ min{m(Γ), 2ǫ +
K
2
(m(I)−m(Sφ,K))}
≥ min{m(Γ),
K
2
m(I)} .
The above estimate shows that the interval Ik grows exponentially with k until it covers Γ. Thus,
there exists a positive number n such that for k ≥ n, we have Ik = Γ.
Hence, µ is an ergodic measure and we have m(suppµ) = m(Γ) which implies that the ergodic
probability measure µ and the Lebesgue measure m are equivalent.
2.2.4 Positive Lyapunov exponent
Let g : X → X be the map defined by
g(x) = Lφ(x) , (2.17)
where L ≥ 1 and φ satisfies assumption (A). From this point onwards we will use the same
notation for the RDS defined by the unimodal map g as we have used in Section 2.2.1 for the
RDS associated with the unimodal map φ.
Note that for every K ≥ 1, the map g is uniformly expanding on the complement of the set
Sg,K = {x ∈ Λg : |g
′(x)| ≤ K} ,
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where Λg denotes the deterministic dynamical interval associated with the unimodal map g. For
every x ∈ Sg,K , since −K/L ≤ φ
′(x) ≤ K/L, there exists a sufficiently large L such that the set
Sg,K is equal to the union of at most two disjoint intervals, i.e.
Sg,K = Jg,K⊔˙ Tg,K ,
where Jg,K is the (non-empty) connected component of Sg,K containing the critical point x
∗
and Tg,K is the (possibly empty) connected component of Sg,K not containing the critical point
(occurring, for instance in the case where supp φ is not bounded).
Let m be the Lebesgue measure. For a sufficiently large L, the length of the interval Jg,K can
be estimated using a Taylor series expansion around the critical point x∗. Hence, we obtain that
the length of the interval Jg,K satisfies:
m(Jg,K) =
2K
|g′′(x∗)|
+O((K/L)2) . (2.18)
We are now going to describe how to compute the length of the tail set Tg,K . We start by
noting that whenever φ is a concave map we have that Tg,K is the empty set and thus
m(Tg,K) = 0 .
On the other hand, if φ is not a concave map, then by item 5 in Assumption (A), there exists
x˜ > x∗ such that φ′′(x) < 0 for every x < x˜ and φ′′(x) ≥ 0 for every x > x˜. Let Γg be the
stochastic dynamical interval associated with the unimodal map g and denote by
x+g = g(x
∗) + ǫ
the right most point of Γg. Let us define x
−
g,K as the unique solution of
g′(x−g,K) = −K
such that x−g,K > x˜. If x
−
g,K > x
+
g , then we again have that Tg,K is the empty set andm(Tg,K) = 0.
If instead x−g,K < x
+
g , we get that
Tg,K = [x
−
g,K , x
+
g ]
and thus
m(Tg,K) = x
+
g − x
−
g,K .
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Moreover, note that the maps g(x) and φ(x) differ only by the multiplicative factor L ≥ 1.
Hence, assumption (A) holds for the map g(x) whenever it holds for the map φ(x). Let ǫmax(L)
be the value defined in Lemma 2.2 when applied to the map g in (2.17) for a fixed value L ≥ 1.
Thus, according to Theorem 2.5, if m(Sg,2) < 2ǫmax(L) then for every m(Sg,2)/2 < ǫ < ǫmax(L),
the ǫ-perturbed RDS defined by the auxiliary map g(x) defined in (2.17) admits a unique ergodic
invariant measure.
Let Eg be the set of all values L ≥ 1 such that the RDS associated with the unimodal map g
has a non-empty stochastic dynamical interval Γg ⊆ R
+. For each L ∈ Eg and K ∈ (1, 2), define
ǫ0(L,K) =
K
infJg,1 |g
′′|
+
x+g − x
−
g,K
2
+
1
lnK
(
1
infJg,1 |g
′′|
+
1
infTg,1 |g
′′|
)
.
The following theorem provides conditions ensuring positivity of the Lyapunov exponent for
the RDS defined by the cocycle gǫ.
Theorem 2.6. Let φ be such that assumption (A) holds and let g be as given in (2.17). For every
L ∈ Eg and K ∈ (1, 2) such that ǫ0(L,K) < ǫmax(L) and every ǫ such that ǫ0(L,K) < ǫ < ǫmax(L),
the RDS defined by the cocycle gǫ has a positive lower bound β for its Lyapunov exponent λ, given
by
β =
(
1−
K
ǫ infJg,1 |g
′′|
−
x+g − x
−
g,K
2ǫ
)
lnK −
1
ǫ infJg,1 |g
′′|
−
1
2ǫ infTg,1 |g
′′|
.
Proof. The Lyapunov exponent of the RDS defined by gǫ is equal to the constant
λ =
∫
X
ln |g′(x)|dµ(x) .
To obtain a lower estimate for the Lyapunov exponent λ, we need to start by bounding the
invariant density ρ from above. The transition kernel p(x, ·) in (2.14) is a Borel probability
measure such that
p(x,A) =
1
2ǫ
m(A ∩Bǫ(g(x))) =
∫
A
ψ(x, y)dm(y) ,
where the density function ψ(x, ·) is given by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
ψ(x, y) =
dp(x, ·)
dm
|y =
1
2ǫ
1Bǫ(g(x))(y)
and 1A(y) denotes the indicator function of the set A. By substituting A = Bδ(x0) in (2.15) for
the stationary Borel measure µ on Γg, we get
µ(Bδ(x0)) =
∫
Γg
p(x,Bδ(x0)) dµ(x) . (2.19)
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Since µ is absolutely continuous with density ρ, we obtain that
lim
δ→0+
µ(Bδ(x0))
m(Bδ(x0))
= ρ(x0) .
Dividing (2.19) by m(Bδ(x0)) and taking the limit when δ → 0
+, we get that
ρ(x0) =
∫
Γg
ψ(x, x0)dµ(x) . (2.20)
Thus, we obtain that for every x ∈ Γ the following inequality holds:
ρ(x) ≤
1
2ǫ
, (2.21)
i.e. the density ρ has a finite upper bound.
For the second part of the proof, take K > 1 and note that
µ(Jg,K) =
∫
Γg
p(x, Jg,K)dµ(x)
=
∫
Γg
p(x, Jg,K)ρ(x)dm(x)
Thus, by definition of the transition kernel p(x,A), we have that
µ(Jg,K) ≤ m(Jg,K) sup
x
ρ(x)
≤
2K
|g′′(x∗)|
1
2ǫ
≤
K
ǫ infJg,K |g
′′(x)|
.
Similarly, based on the remark preceding the statement of Theorem 2.6 we have that
µ(Tg,K) ≤ m(Tg,K) sup
x
ρ(x)
=
x+g − x
−
g,K
2ǫ
.
Moreover, using integration by parts and the change of variables r = |g′(x)|, we conclude that
there exist constants C1 and C2 defined by
C1 = −
2
infJg,1 |g
′′(x)|
and C2 = −
1
infTg,1 |g
′′(x)|
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and such that ∫
Ig,1
ln |g′(x)|dm(x) ≥ C1
and ∫
Tg,1
ln |g′(x)|dm(x) ≥ C2 .
To find a lower bound for λ, fix a number 1 < K < 2 and take L sufficiently large such that
Sg,K = Jg,K⊔˙ Tg,K .
Note also that Jg,1 ⊆ Jg,K . Thus, we obtain that
λ ≥
∫
(Sg,K)c
ln |g′|dµ+
∫
Jg,1
ln |g′|dµ+
∫
Tg,1
ln |g′|dµ
≥
(
µ(Λg)− µ(Jg,K)− µ(Tg,K)
)
lnK
+sup
Jg,1
ρ(x)
∫
Jg,1
ln |g′|dm+ sup
Tg,1
ρ(x)
∫
Tg,1
ln |g′|dm .
Therefore, combining the inequality (2.21) and identity (2.18) with the previous inequality, we
obtain
λ ≥
(
1−
K
ǫ infJg,1 |g
′′|
−
x+g − x
−
g,K
2ǫ
)
lnK −
1
ǫ infJg,1 |g
′′|
−
1
2ǫ infTg,1 |g
′′|
. (2.22)
Hence, we obtain that if ǫ0(L,K) is given by
ǫ0(L,K) =
K
infJg,1 |g
′′|
+
x+g − x
−
g,K
2
+
1
lnK
(
1
infJg,1 |g
′′|
+
1
infTg,1 |g
′′|
)
,
if L is sufficiently large and ǫ is such that ǫ0(L,K) < ǫ < ǫmax, the ǫ-perturbed RDS defined by
the auxiliary map g has a positive Lyapunov exponent for a.e. x ∈ Γg with lower bound given by
the right hand side of (2.22).
Corollary 2.1. Let φ be such that assumption (A) holds and let ǫmax be as given in Lemma 2.2.
Suppose that for fixed 1 < K < 2 we have that
φ′(φ(x∗) + ǫmax) < −K (2.23)
and let
ǫ0 :=
(
K +
1
lnK
)
1
infJφ,1 |φ
′′|
< ǫmax .
Then for every ǫ such that ǫ0 < ǫ < ǫmax the RDS defined by φǫ has a positive Lyapunov exponent.
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Proof. Inequality (2.23) ensures that Tφ,K = ∅ for every fixed 1 < K < 2. Thus, from the proof
of Theorem 2.6, we get
ǫ0 =
(
K +
1
lnK
)
1
infJφ,1 |φ
′′|
.
Hence, if ǫ0 < ǫ < ǫmax, the RDS defined by the map φ has a positive Lyapunov exponent for a.e.
x ∈ Γ.
The following example exhibits one relevant family of unimodal maps to which Theorem 2.6
applies.
Example 2.1. Consider the following two-parameter family of quadratic maps:
φµ,a =
4µ
a2
x(a− x) .
We are interested in the following regime of parameters: a > 0 large and µ close to, but larger
than, a/2. It is easy to see that the critical point of the unimodal maps φµ,a is x
∗ = a/2. Moreover,
computing the first two iterates of the critical point, we obtain that the deterministic dynamical
interval associated with this family of maps is
Λφµ,a =
[
4µ2
a2
(a− µ), µ
]
,
which has length equal to
m
(
Λφµ,a
)
=
4µ
a2
(
µ−
a
2
)2
.
Additionally, following the characterization obtained for ǫ∗ in Lemma 2.2, we get that
ǫ∗ =
a
µ
(
µ−
a
2
)
.
Hence, we conclude that
ǫmax = min
{
a− µ,
4µ2
a2
(a− µ),
a
µ
(
µ−
a
2
)}
.
It is clear that by making a larger, and consequently, taking larger values of µ > a/2, the bound
ǫmax can be made as large as desired. Furthermore, it is also possible to check that for a fixed
length of the deterministic dynamical interval of φµ,a, the bound ǫmax can also be made arbitrarily
large, thus fulfilling the conditions of Theorem 2.5, guaranteeing that the RDS obtained by addi-
tive random perturbations of the unimodal map φµ,a has an ergodic invariant measure which is
equivalent to the Lebesgue measure.
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Notice that for the family of maps φµ,a under consideration now, the set tail set Tφµ,a,K is
empty for every choice of K ∈ (1, 2). Hence, recalling the definition of ǫ0 given in Corollary 2.6,
we obtain
ǫ0 =
a2
8µ
(K + ln(K))
Comparing ǫ0 with ǫmax, we obtain that ǫ0 < ǫmax provided the following inequality holds:
µ >
a
2
+
a
8
(
K +
1
ln(K)
)
.
Thus, provided the inequality above is satisfied, then for every ǫ ∈ (ǫ0, ǫmax) we obtain that the
RDS obtained by additive perturbations of φµ,a with maximum size ǫ has a positive Lyapunov
exponent.
Even though this example is based in a quadratic map (with support on the compact interval
[0, a]), it is an easy task to construct an example of a map whose support is the positive half line,
by changing φµ,a outside of its dynamical interval in such a way that the conditions in assumption
(A) are preserved.
2.2.5 An application to an overlapping generations model
In this section we will consider a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model like the one
introduced in [1] and discuss a potential application for our main results. We provide numerical
evidence showing that the bpf map φ for this OLGmodel always has a positive Lyapunov exponent
for almost all points under a sufficiently large stochastic perturbation.
Let us consider an OLG economy for a population with constant size and such that the
proportions of young and old agents remain unchanged over time. We assume that the there
exists a representative agent with preferences given by a separable utility function
U(ct, ct+1) = V1(ct) + V2(ct+1) ,
where V1 and V2 are the utilities representing the individual preferences concerning consumption
in the first and second periods of their life, and ct, ct+1 denote the corresponding consumption in
each period. We suppose also that one unit of the good is produced with one unit of the unique
productive factor (labor) and let l∗1 and l
∗
2 denote the agents labor endowments in the first and
second periods of their life, respectively. Finally, we assume that there is a risk-free asset that
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can be purchased by the agents providing a gross return zt = 1 + rt > 1, where rt is the interest
rate at period t, and that the dynamics of the money supply are determined by
Mt+1 =Mtzt+1 ,
for some initial condition M0.
At this point, let us recall some basic notations from the literature (see [1], [14] for further
details). A map
Z˜ : X × P(X)→ Rn ,
is called stochastic excess demand function if an equilibrium condition is given by the zero set of
this map. We can then define a deterministic excess demand function Z : X ×X → Rn as being
given by
Z(x0, x1) := Z˜(x0, δx1) ,
where δx1 denotes the Dirac measure supported at x1 ∈ X. If x0 is the current value of the state
variable and x1 is the expectation for sure of its future value, the equation Z(x0, x1) = 0 is said
to be a deterministic equilibrium condition. A backward prefect foresight (bpf) map is a function
φ : X → X such that Z(φ(x), x) = 0 for all x ∈ X.
We impose the following additional conditions on the utility function Vτ , τ = 1, 2 describing
the agents preferences.
(C1) For each τ = 1, 2 , Vτ is continuous on [0,+∞) and twice continuously differentiable on
(0,+∞). Moreover, Vτ is strictly increasing and strictly concave and satisfies
lim
cτ→+∞
V ′τ (cτ ) = 0 , lim
cτ→0
V ′τ (cτ ) = +∞ , Θ¯ :=
V ′1(l
∗
1)
V ′2(l
∗
2)
< 1 .
(C2) The Arrow-Pratt relative degree of risk aversion of the old, given by
RV2(x) = −
xV ′′2 (x)
V ′2(x)
,
is a non-decreasing function of x.
See [27] and the references therein for further comments and motivation for the hypothesis (C1)-
(C2), guaranteeing that the bpf map φ is unimodal.
We will now introduce a consumption-savings problem for the representative agent. Let pt
and pt+1 denote the prices of the unique good in the economy during the first and second periods
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of the individual’s life. Note that while pt is known by the individual during the first stage of her
life, her knowledge concerning pt+1 consists of a probability distribution µt+1 representing the
likelihood of occurrence of particular values of pt+1 and reflecting the individual’s beliefs about
the state of economy during the second period of her life. The agent must choose a consumption
plan ct, ct+1 and the first period savings mt as a solution to the following optimization problem
max
{ct,ct+1,mt}
V1(ct) + Eµt+1
[
V2(ct+1)
]
(2.24)
subject to the budget constraints
ptct +mt = ptl
∗
1
pt+1ct+1 = pt+1l
∗
2 + ztmt .
Working out the first order condition for an interior solution of (2.24) leads to
−
1
pt
V ′1
(
l∗1 −
mt
pt
)
+ Eµt+1
[
zt
pt+1
V ′2
(
l∗2 +
ztmt
pt+1
)]
= 0 . (2.25)
Under the monetary equilibrium condition Mt = mt, and introducing the new variable
xt =
Mt
pt
,
the first order condition (2.25) may be rewritten as
ν1(xt) = Eµt+1 [ν2(xt+1)] , (2.26)
where ν1 and ν2 are the the auxiliary functions defined by
ν1(x) = xV
′
1(l
∗
1 − x) , ν2(x) = xV
′
2(l
∗
2 + x) . (2.27)
The equilibrium condition (2.26) defines the stochastic excess demand function
Z˜(x, µ) = ν1(x)−Eµ
[
ν2(x
′)
]
.
The deterministic excess demand function associated with Z˜ is then given by
Z(x, x′) = Z˜(x, δx′) = ν1(x)− ν2(x
′) ,
defining the associated bpf map through the implicit relation
Z(φ(x), x) = 0 .
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Under condition (C1), it is possible to check that the map ν1 defined in (2.27) is strictly increasing,
and thus invertible. Hence, we obtain that the backward perfect foresight map is of the form
φ(x) = ν−11 (ν2(x)) , (2.28)
and the corresponding bpf dynamical system is determined by
xt = φ(xt+1) = ν
−1
1 (ν2(xt+1)) .
This bpf map represents the dynamics of the prices of the unique good in the economy. If
conditions (C1) and (C2) hold and there exists x0 ≥ 0 such that RV2(x0) > 1, then in [2] it is
proven that the bpf map φ is a unimodal map with φ(0) = 0 and φ′(0) > 1.
Now, as a particular example, we consider the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function
Vτ (c) =
c1−ατ
1− ατ
, τ = 1, 2 , (2.29)
where α1 ∈ (0, 1) and α2 ∈ (2,+∞) are, respectively, the relative degrees of risk aversion for the
representative agent in the first and second periods of her life. Thus, the deterministic excess
demand function is given by
Z(x, x′) =
x
(l∗1 − x)
α1
+
x′
(l∗2 + x
′)α2
(2.30)
and we obtain the bpf map φ from solving the implicit equation Z(φ(x), x) = 0.
Depending on the values of the parameter in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility functions (2.29), the associated bpf map φ(x) defined by (2.28) has an attracting periodic
orbit and the dynamics has a negative Lyapunov exponent or the bpf map φ has an absolutely
continuous invariant probability measure and the dynamics has a positive Lyapunov exponent. In
the following corollary, we provide conditions under which the ǫ-perturbed RDS φǫ has a positive
Lyapunov exponent.
Corollary 2.2. Assume that conditions (C1) and (C2) hold and let ǫmax and ǫ0 be the quantities
given in Lemma 2.2 and Theorem 2.6, respectively. Then, if ǫ0 < ǫmax, the RDS defined by
the bpf map φ associated with the deterministic excess demand function in (2.30) has a positive
Lyapunov exponent whenever the random perturbations have size ǫ such that ǫ ∈ (ǫ0, ǫmax).
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ǫ 0 0.005 0.05 0.1 0.14
LE −0.5901 −0.4041 0.0087 0.4818 0.7772
Table 2.1: Lyapunov exponent of some different ǫ-perturbed RDS φǫ.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2.6 by noting that Conditions (C1) and (C2) together with the
choice of risk aversion parameters α1 ∈ (0, 1) and α2 ∈ (2,+∞) guarantee the criteria listed in
Assumption (A).
We should remark that the estimates obtained in Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.1 are not sharp.
Those results can be improved in two directions. On the one hand, the lower bound obtained for
the Lyapunov exponent can be made smaller. On the other hand, the range of values of ǫ to which
those results apply is rather restrictive. Indeed, we believe that the Lyapunov exponent is still
positive for random perturbations of size ǫ smaller than ǫ0. To further support these statements,
we will now provide some numerical results.
We fix the parameters l∗1 = 3.5, l
∗
2 = 0.6, α1 = 0.2, α2 = 5 in the deterministic excess demand
function (2.30). Due to the form of (2.30) and the definition of the bpf map in (2.28), it is possible
to check that the critical point of φ is given by
x∗ =
l∗2
α2 − 1
.
For a plot of the bpf map for this choice of parameters, see Figure 2.5.
Using numerical simulation it is also possible to obtain the estimate
ǫmax ≈ 0.147 . . .
for the maximum value of ǫ for which a stochastic dynamical interval still exists for the RDS
determined by the cocycle defined by the bpf map φ.
We then estimate the Lyapunov exponent for such RDS using standard numerical methods for
one-dimensional maps ([30, 39]) for varing sizes of the perturbation size ǫ. We provide a summary
of the outcomes of some of these numerical experiments in the table 2.1.
We remark that the Lyapunov exponent turns from negative to positive when ǫ ≈ 0.045 . . ..
Additionally, in Figures 2.6 we plot the histograms of the RDS orbits used to compute the
Lyapunov exponents in Table 2.1. Note that for values of ǫ very close to zero, the histograms
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Figure 2.5: The bpf map φ for fixed values of parameters l∗1 = 3.5, l
∗
2 = 0.6, α1 = 0.2, α2 = 5.
look as if the system as a singular measure (in this case having support on a period two orbit).
However, for large values of ǫ, these histograms are already good approximations for the densities
associated with absolutely continuous stationary measures, whose existence is guaranteed by
Theorem 2.5 for sufficiently large ǫ.
2.2.6 Conclusions
We have studied the influence of a large additive deviations on a perfect foresight equilibrium path
associated with an unimodal map, where the large deviations are modeled through a sequence
of independent and identically distributed random variables. To move on with such study, we
have obtained general conditions under which an ergodic absolutely continuous invariant measure
exists for random dynamical systems defined by i.i.d. additive random perturbations of unimodal
maps. Furthermore, under appropriate conditions, we have obtained a positive lower bound for
the corresponding Lyapunov exponent for almost every point of the interval.
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Figure 2.6: Histograms for the distribution of iterations of the bpf map φ subject to perturbations
of maximum size ǫ = 0 (top left), ǫ = 0.005 (top right), ǫ = 0.05 (second row left), ǫ = 0.1 (second
row right) and ǫ = 0.14 (bottom).
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Chapter 3
International trade and game theory
We consider two firms located in different countries selling the same homogeneous good in both
countries. In each country there is a tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country.
We study the international trade model as a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments.
We use the relevant economic quantities as the utilities of these strategic games and we compare
the Nash equilibrium with the social optimum equilibrium. The lack of coincidence of these
equilibria is a main difficulty in international trade that can be partially dealt with the use of
trade agreements.
Then we add uncertainty on the production costs of the firms and we compute the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium. We show that the expected profit of the firms and the expected welfare
of the countries increase with the variances of the production costs of both firms. When the
production costs are similar enough, we show that this international trade model is like the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (see [26]) in the sense that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium consists in both
firms imposing tariffs but if both governments do not impose tariffs then both countries will get
a higher welfare.
3.1 Strategic tariffs in international duopoly game
In this section we study an international trade model consisting of a game with two stages. For
the second stage of the game we find the Nash equilibrium for the firms in terms of the home
quantities and the export quantities that maximize their profits in a competitive market. Then,
using the Nash equilibrium for the firms, we find for the tariffs imposed by the governments the
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Nash equilibrium and the social equilibrium using different utilities related with the different
economic agents involved in the international trade model.
In subsection 3.1.1 we explain the three typical game outcomes that can arise from comparing
the Nash equilibrium with the social equilibrium. In subsection 3.1.2 we define the international
duopoly model that we use in this chapter. In subsection 3.1.3 we determine the Nash equilibrium
of the second subgame in the case of complete information. In subsection 3.1.4 we find the Nash
tariffs and the social tariffs for different utilities related with the different economic agents involved
in the international trade model. In subsection 3.1.5 we compute the Nash welfare and the social
welfare and we find which of the three typical games occurs depending upon the initial production
costs. Finally, in subsection 3.1.6 we do the static analysis of the relevant economic quantities of
the international trade model by comparing the perfect Nash equilibrium with the social optimum
equilibrium for the welfare of the countries.
3.1.1 Strategic tariffs
In this subsection, we introduce the most relevant game theoretical concepts that we will use in
the other sections to understand the strategic behaviour of firms, consumers and governments of
the countries.
Let ui(ti, tj) and uj(ti, tj) be two relevant economic quantities of the countries Xi and Xj
depending only upon the tariffs ti and tj imposed by the governments of the two countries. For
instance, for every pair of tariffs (ti, tj), the functions ui(ti, tj) and uj(ti, tj) can be the profit of
the firms or the consumer surplus at the competitive Nash equilibrium for the quantities produced
by the firms.
We are going to interpret ui(ti, tj) and uj(ti, tj) as the utilities of a game where the players
are the governments of the countries and their actions are the tariffs (ti, tj).
The quantity tBRi (tj) ≡ t
BR
i (tj;u) is the best response of the country Xi for the utility ui, if
for all tariffs ti,
ui(t
BR
i (tj), tj) ≥ ui(ti, tj) .
A pair of tariffs (tNi , t
N
j ) ≡ (t
N
i (u), t
N
j (u)) is a Nash equilibrium or a global strategic optimum, if
for all tariffs ti
ui(t
N
i , t
N
j ) ≥ ui(ti, t
N
j )
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and for all tariffs tj
uj(t
N
i , t
N
j ) ≥ ui(t
N
i , tj) .
In other words, a pair of tariffs (tNi , t
N
j ) is a Nash equilibrium, if
tNi = t
BR
i (t
N
j ) and t
N
j = t
BR
j (t
N
i ) .
A pair of tariffs (tPi , t
P
j ) ≡ (t
P
i (W ), t
P
j (W )) is a Pareto optimum, if there is no pair (ti, tj) of tariffs
such that
ui(ti, tj) ≥ ui(t
P
i , t
P
j ) for all i, j ∈ {1, 2},
and at least one utility ui, i ∈ {1, 2} gets a better payoff with (ti, tj) than with (t
P
i , t
P
j ), i.e.
ui(ti, tj) > ui(t
P
i , t
P
j ) .
The social utility uS is
uS(ti, tj) = ui(ti, tj) + uj(ti, tj) .
The quantity tSRi (tj) ≡ t
SR
i (tj ;u) is the social best response, if for all tariffs ti
uS(t
SR
i (tj), tj) ≥ uS(ti, tj) .
A pair of tariffs (tSi , t
S
j ) ≡ (t
S
i (u), t
S
j (u)) is a social optimum, if for all tariffs ti
uS(t
S
i , t
S
j ) ≥ uS(ti, t
S
j ) ,
and for all tariffs tj
uS(t
S
i , t
S
j ) ≥ uS(t
S
i , tj) .
In other words, a pair of tariffs (tSi , t
S
j ) is a social optimum, if
tSi = t
SR
i (t
S
j ) and t
S
j = t
SR
j (t
S
i ) .
We observe that a social optimum is a Pareto optimum. For games with a unique Nash equilib-
rium, we describe the three typical games outcomes when we compare the social optimum with
the Nash equilibrium.
(SE) Social equilibrium: When the social optimum coincides with the Nash equilibrium
(tSi , t
S
j ) = (t
N
i , t
N
j )
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and the social optimum is the only Pareto optimum. In this case, the individualist Nash
choice of the tariffs by the governments leads to a social equilibrium. Hence, a priori there
is no need of a trade agreement between the two governments of the two countries.
(PD) Prisoner’s dilemma: When the social optimum (tSi , t
S
j ) is different from the Nash
equilibrium
tSi 6= t
N
i or t
S
j 6= t
N
j
and both utilities are bigger in the social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium,
ui(t
S
i , t
S
j ) > ui(t
N
i , t
N
j ) and uj(t
S
i , t
S
j ) > uj(t
N
i , t
N
j ) .
In this case, the game is like the Prisoner’s dilemma, where the Nash strategy leads to a
lower outcome for both countries than if they would agree among therein (through a trade
agreement) in opting for the social optimum.
(LW) Lose-win social strategies: When the social optimum (tSi , t
S
j ) is different from the
Nash equilibrium
tSi 6= t
N
i or t
S
j 6= t
N
j
and one of the utilities is bigger in the social optimum and the other utility is bigger in the
Nash equilibrium,
ui(t
S
i , t
S
j ) < ui(t
N
i , t
N
j ) and uj(t
S
i , t
S
j ) > uj(t
N
i , t
N
j ) .
In this case, the governments can implement an external mechanism (trade agreement)
that will force them to opt for the social optimum in such a way that the country with the
advantage in its utility compensates the loss in the utility of the other country and can also
give some extra benefit to persuade the other country to implement the social equilibrium.
3.1.2 International duopoly model
In this subsection, we introduce the relevant economic quantities of the international duopoly
model.
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The international duopoly model is a game with two stages (subgames). In the first stage, both
governments choose simultaneously their Nash or social tariffs for a utility given by a relevant
economic quantity; and, in the second stage, the firms choose simultaneously their home and
export quantities to maximize competitively their profits.
The home consumption hi is the quantity produced by the firm Fi and consumed in its own
country Xi. The export ei is the quantity produced by the firm Fi and consumed in the country
Xj of the other firm Fj , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. The tariff rate ti is determined by the
government of country Xi on the import quantity ej . The total quantity qi produced by firm Fi
is
qi ≡ qi(hi, ei) = hi + ei .
The aggregate quantity Qi sold on the market in the country Xi is
Qi ≡ Qi(hi, ej) = hi + ej .
The inverse demand pi in the country Xi is
pi ≡ pi(hi, ej) = α−Qi ,
where α ≥ 0 is the demand intercept. The payoff πi of firm Fi is
πi ≡ πi(hi, ei, hj , ej ; ti, tj) = (pi − ci)hi + (pj − ci)ei − tjei ,
where ci ≥ 0 is the firm Fi’s unitary production cost. The custom revenue CRi of the country Xi
is given by
CRi ≡ CRi(ej ; ti) = tiej .
The consumer surplus CSi in the country Xi is given by
CSi ≡ CSi(hi, ej) =
1
2
Q2i .
The welfare Wi of the country Xi is
Wi ≡Wi(hi, ei, hj , ej ; ti, tj) = CRi +CSi + πi .
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3.1.3 Second stage Nash equilibrium
In this subsection, we give an original presentation of the Nash equilibrium of the second subgame
in the case of complete information, i.e. when both firms have full information on their and others
utility functions.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. Define
Ti ≡ Ti(ci, cj) = (α+ ci − 2cj)/2 ,
Tj ≡ Tj(ci, cj) = (α+ cj − 2ci)/2 .
Assumption (A1): For all i ∈ {1, 2}, Ti > 0 and
0 ≤ ti ≤ Ti .
By assumption (A1), we obtain that
α− ci =
2(Ti + 2Tj)
3
> 0 ;
and if ci = cj = c then
Ti = Tj =
α− c
2
> 0 .
The best response (hBRi (ej), e
BR
i (hj ; tj)) of the firm Fi is the solution of
(hBRi (ej), e
BR
i (hj ; tj)) = argmax(hi,ei)πi(hi, ei, hj , ej ; ti, tj).
Hence, 

hBRi (ej) =
α−ej−ci
2
eBRi (hj ; tj) =
α−hj−ci−tj
2 .
The Nash equilibrium (hNi (ti), e
N
i (tj);h
N
j (tj), e
N
j (ti)) is the solution of

(hNi (ti), e
N
i (tj)) = (h
BR
i (e
N
j (ti)), e
BR
i (h
N
j (tj); tj))
(hNj (tj), e
N
j (ti)) = (h
BR
j (e
N
i (tj)), e
BR
j (h
N
i (ti); ti)) .
Under assumption (A1), for every ti ∈ [0, Ti] and every tj ∈ [0, Tj ], the home h
N
i (ti) and
export eNi (tj) quantities for the firms at the Nash equilibrium (see [26]) are
hNi (ti) ≡ h
N
i (ci, cj ; ti) =
2Tj + ti
3
,
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eNi (tj) ≡ e
N
i (ci, cj ; tj) =
2(Tj − tj)
3
.
We observe that the export quantity eNi (tj) is positive if, and only if, assumption (A1) holds.
3.1.4 Strategic games
In this subsection, we will analyse the advantages and disadvantages of the use of tariffs for the
firms, the consumers and the governments of the countries. To do it, we will use the relevant
economic quantities as utilities ui(ti, tj) and uj(ti, tj) of a game where the players are the gov-
ernments of the countries and their actions are the tariffs (ti, tj). For each pair of utilities that
we will consider, we will find which of the three typical games occurs: social equilibrium (SE),
prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or lose-win social strategies (LW).
Tariff effects in produced quantities and prices
The home quantity hNi (ti) increases with the tariff ti, and so
tBRi (tj ;h) = Ti and (t
N
i (h), t
N
j (h)) = (Ti, Tj) .
The social utility hNS (ti, tj) is
hNS (ti, tj) =
2(Ti + Tj) + ti + tj
3
and so
tSRi (tj;h) = Ti and (t
S
i (h), t
S
j (h)) = (Ti, Tj) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (h) = t
N
i (h) = Ti .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = hi, is of the type SE.
The export quantity eNi (tj) decreases with the tariff tj , but does not depend upon the tariff
ti. Hence, every tariff ti is a best response and so every pair of tariffs is a Nash equilibrium
tBRi (tj; e) ∈ [0, Ti] and (t
N
i (e), t
N
j (e)) ∈ [0, Ti]× [0, Tj ] .
The social utility eNS (ti, tj) is
eNS (ti, tj) =
2(Ti + Tj)− 2(ti + tj)
3
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and so
tSRi (tj; e) = 0 and (t
S
i (e), t
S
j (e)) = (0, 0) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum, that is the unique Pareto optimum
tSi (e) = 0 .
The total quantity qNi (ti, tj) produced by firm Fi is
qNi (ti, tj) ≡ q
N
i (ci, cj ; ti, tj) =
1
3
(4Tj + ti − 2tj)
and so the total quantity qNi (ti, tj) increases with ti and decreases with tj. Thus, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium
tBRi (tj ; q) = Ti and (t
N
i (q), t
N
j (q)) = (Ti, Tj) .
For every pair of tariffs (ti, tj), with ti ≥ tj , we have
qNi (ti − tj, 0) > q
N
i (ti, tj)
and
qNj (ti − tj, 0) > q
N
j (ti, tj) .
Hence, a pair of tariffs (ti, tj) is a Pareto optimum with respect to the utility q
N
i (ti, tj) if, and
only if,
(ti, tj) ∈ P(q) ,
where
P(q) = {(ti, tj) ∈ [0, ti]× [0, tj ] : ti = 0 ∨ tj = 0} .
The social utility qNS (ti, tj) is
qNS (ti, tj) =
4(Ti + Tj)− (ti + tj)
3
and so
tSRi (tj ; q) = 0 and (t
S
i (q), t
S
j (q)) = (0, 0) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium
tSi (q) 6= t
N
i (q)
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and
qNi (t
N
i , t
N
j ) < q
N
i (t
S
i , t
S
j ) and q
N
j (t
N
i , t
N
j ) < q
N
j (t
S
i , t
S
j ) .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = qi, is of the type PD.
The aggregate quantity QNi (ti) in the market of country Xi is
QNi (ti) ≡ Q
N
i (ci, cj ; ti) =
2(Ti + Tj)− ti
3
and so
tBRi (tj ;Q) = 0 and (t
N
i (Q), t
N
j (Q)) = (0, 0) .
The social utility QNS (ti, tj) is
QNS (ti, tj) = q
N
S (ti, tj)
and so
tSRi (tj ;Q) = 0 and (t
S
i (Q), t
S
j (Q)) = (0, 0) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (Q) = t
N
i (Q) = 0 .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = Qi, is of the type SE.
The inverse demand function pNi (ti) of the firm Fi is
pNi (ti) ≡ p
N
i (ci, cj ; ti) =
α+ ci + cj + ti
3
and so
tBRi (tj ; p) = Ti and (t
N
i (p), t
N
j (p)) = (Ti, Tj) .
The social utility pNS (ti, tj) is
pNS (ti, tj) =
2(α+ ci + cj) + ti + tj
3
and so
tSRi (tj; p) = Ti and (t
S
i (p), t
S
j (p)) = (Ti, Tj) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (p) = t
N
i (p) = Ti .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = p
N
i , is of the type SE.
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Consumers savings effects from using tariffs
The consumers savings are measured by the consumer surplus. The consumer surplus CSNi (ti) is
CSNi (ti) ≡ CS
N
i (ci, cj ; ti) =
(
2(Ti + Tj)− ti
)2
18
,
and so
tBRi (tj ;CS) = 0 and (t
N
i (CS), t
N
j (CS)) = (0, 0) .
The social utility CSNS (ti, tj) is
CSNS (ti, tj) =
(
2(Ti + Tj)− ti
)2
18
+
(
2(Ti + Tj)− tj
)2
18
and so
tSRi (tj ;CS) = 0 and (t
S
i (CS), t
S
j (CS)) = (0, 0) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (CS) = t
N
i (CS) = 0 .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = CSi, is of the type SE.
Firms profits effects from using tariffs
The profit πNi (ti, tj) of the firm Fi is
πNi (ti, tj) ≡ π
N
i (ci, cj ; ti, tj) =
1
9
[(2Tj + ti)
2 + 4(Tj − tj)
2] .
Thus, the profit πNi (ti, tj) increases with ti and decreases with tj , and so
tBRi (tj , π) = Ti and (t
N
i (π), t
N
j (π)) = (Ti, Tj) .
The social utility πNS (ti, tj) is
πNS (ti, tj) =
1
9
[(2Tj + ti)
2 + (2Ti + tj)
2 + 4(Ti − ti)
2 + 4(Tj − tj)
2] .
Hence,
∂πNS
∂ti
=
4(Tj − 2Ti) + 10ti
9
.
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Noting that
∂2πNS
∂t2i
=
10
9
> 0
we obtain that the local maxima of πNS is attained at the boundary points of the admissible tariffs
tSRi (tj ;π) ∈ {0, Ti} .
Since,
πNS (Ti, tj)− π
N
S (0, tj) =
Ti
9
(4Tj − 3Ti)
there are two possible cases:
Case I: 9Tj < 12Ti < 16Tj . We have
tSRi (tj;π) = Ti and t
SR
j (ti;π) = Tj .
Thus,
(tSi (π), t
S
j (π)) = (Ti, Tj) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (π) = t
N
i (π) = Ti .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = π
N
i , is of the type SE.
Case II: 0 < 4Tj ≤ 3Ti (similarly, 0 < 4Ti ≤ 3Tj). We have
tSRi (tj ;π) = 0 and t
SR
j (ti;π) = Tj .
Therefore,
(tSi (π), t
S
j (π)) = (0, Tj) .
Hence, there is a unique social optimum but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium
tNi (π) 6= t
S
i (π) and t
N
j (π) = t
S
j (π) = Tj .
Furthermore,
πNj (t
N
i , t
N
j ) < π
N
j (t
S
i , t
S
j ) and π
N
i (t
N
i , t
N
j ) > π
N
i (t
S
i , t
S
j ) .
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = π
N
i , is of the type LW.
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Governments direct gains from using tariffs
The direct gain in using tariffs, by the governments, are given by the custom revenues. The
custom revenue CRNi (ti) is
CRNi (ti) ≡ CR
N
i (ci, cj ; ti) =
2ti(Ti − ti)
3
.
By assumption (A1), CRNi (ti) > 0. The custom revenue increases with the tariff ti ∈ [0, Ti/2],
and it decreases with the tariff ti ∈ [Ti/2, Ti],
CRNi (0) = CR
N
i (Ti) ≤ CR
N
i (ti) ≤ CR
N
i
(
Ti
2
)
=
T 2i
6
and so
tBRi (tj , CR) =
Ti
2
and (tNi (CR), t
N
j (CR)) =
(
Ti
2
,
Tj
2
)
.
The social utility CRNS (ti, tj) is
CRNS (ti, tj) =
2ti(Ti − ti)
3
+
2tj(Tj − tj)
3
and so
tSRi (tj;CR) =
Ti
2
and
(
tSi (CR), t
S
j (CR)
)
=
(
Ti
2
,
Tj
2
)
.
Hence, there is a unique social optimum (that is the unique Pareto optimum) and coincides with
the Nash equilibrium
tSi (CR) = t
N
i (CR) =
Ti
2
.
Therefore, the game, with utility ui = CR
N
i , is of the type SE.
3.1.5 Nash and social welfares
In this subsection, we will find which of the three typical games occurs depending upon the
production costs: social equilibrium (SE), prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or lose-win social strategies
(LW).
Recall that the welfare WNi (ti, tj) of the country Xi is
WNi (ti, tj) = π
N
i (ti, tj) + CR
N
i (ti) + CS
N
i (ti)
=
1
9
[
10T 2j + 2T
2
i + 4TiTj + (4Ti + 2Tj)ti − 8Tjtj + 4t
2
j −
9t2i
2
]
.
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We have that
∂WNi
∂ti
=
4Ti + 2Tj
9
− ti .
Therefore, the maximum point of the polynomial WNi (ti, tj) is
AW,i =
2(Tj + 2Ti)
9
.
Noting that AW,i < Ti is equivalent to 2Tj < 5Ti, we get that the best response is
tBRi (tj ,W ) =


AW,i , if Tj <
5Ti
2 ;
Ti , otherwise .
The social utility WNS (ti, tj) is
WNS (ti, tj) =W
N
i (ti, tj) +W
N
j (ti, tj) .
Hence, we have that
∂WNS
∂ti
=
2Tj − 4Ti − ti
9
.
Let
BWS ,i = 2(Tj − 2Ti) .
Noting that 0 < BWS ,i < Ti is equivalent to 2Ti < Tj < 5Ti/2, we get that the social best response
is
tSRi (tj;W ) =


0 , if Tj ≤ 2Ti ;
BWS ,i , if 2Ti < Tj <
5Ti
2 ;
Ti , if Tj ≥
5Ti
2 .
Hence, we have three possible cases:
Case I: Ti ≤ 2Tj and Tj ≤ 2Ti . The Nash equilibrium is
(tNi (W ), t
N
j (W )) = (AW,i, AW,j) .
The social equilibrium is
(tSi (W ), t
S
j (W )) = (0, 0) .
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In case I, there are two possible subcases:
(a) 0.63 . . . Tj < Ti < 1.57 . . . Tj and 0.63 . . . Ti < Tj < 1.57 . . . Ti. Then,
WNi (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) > W
N
i (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W ))
and
WNj (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) > W
N
j (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W )) .
Hence, there is a unique social equilibrium but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the game is of the type PD.
(b) 1.57 . . . Tj < Ti ≤ 2Tj (case (c) 0.5Tj ≤ Ti < 0.63 . . . Tj is similar), then
WNi (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) < W
N
i (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W ))
and
WNj (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) > W
N
j (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W )) .
Hence, there is a unique social equilibrium but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the game is of the type LW.
Case II: 2Ti < Tj < 5Ti/2 (similarly, 2Ti/5 < Tj < Ti/2). The Nash equilibrium is
(tNi (W ), t
N
j (W )) = (AW,i, AW,j) .
The social equilibrium is
(tSi (W ), t
S
j (W )) = (BWS ,i, 0) .
Since
BWS ,i < AW,i
then,
tSi (W ) 6= t
N
i (W ) and t
S
j (W ) 6= t
N
j (W ) .
Moreover,
WNi (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) > W
N
i (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W ))
and
WNj (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) < W
N
j (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W )) .
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Hence, there is a unique social equilibrium but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the game is of the type LW.
Case III: 5Ti ≤ 2Tj (similarly, 5Tj ≤ 2Ti). The Nash equilibrium is
(tNi (W ), t
N
j (W )) = (Ti, AW,j) .
The social equilibrium is
(tSi (W ), t
S
j (W )) = (Ti, 0) .
Thus,
WNi (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) > W
N
i (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W ))
and
WNj (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) < W
N
j (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W )) .
Hence, there is a unique social equilibrium but it does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the game is of the type LW.
3.1.6 Static analysis
In this subsection, we compare the values of the relevant economic quantities of the interna-
tional trade model computed in the case of the perfect Nash subgame equilibrium with the ones
computed in the social optimum.
For every pair of tariffs (ti, tj) ∈ [0, Ti] × [0, Tj ], we assume that in the second subgame the
firms choose the Nash equilibrium
(hNi (ti), e
N
i (tj), h
N
j (tj), e
N
j (ti))
computed in the previous section.
The perfect Nash subgame equilibrium consists in the governments to choose the pair of tariffs
(tNi , t
N
j ) that maximize the competitive welfare of the governments, i.e. the Nash equilibrium for
the first stage game
(tNi , t
N
j ) = (t
N
i (W ), t
N
j (W )) ,
where (tNi (W ), t
N
j (W )) was computed in the previous section.
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The social optimum consists in both governments to choose the pair of tariffs (tSi , t
S
j ) that
maximize the joint welfare of the countries, i.e. the social optimum for the first stage game
(tSi , t
S
j ) = (t
S
i (W ), t
S
j (W )) ,
where (tSi (W ), t
S
j (W )) was computed in the previous section.
Therefore, we have three possible cases:
Case I: Ti ≤ 2Tj and Tj ≤ 2Ti . The Nash tariffs for the first stage game are
(tNi , t
N
j ) =
(
2(Tj + 2Ti)/9, 2(Ti + 2Tj)/9
)
.
The social tariffs for the first stage game are
(tSi , t
S
j ) = (0, 0) .
The home quantity hPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
hPi =
4(5Tj + Ti)
27
.
The home quantity hSi at the social optimum is
hSi =
2Tj
3
.
Hence,
hPi − h
S
i =
4Ti + 2Tj
27
> 0.
The export quantity ePi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
ePi =
2(5Tj − 2Ti)
27
.
The export quantity eSi at the social optimum is
eSi =
2Tj
3
.
Hence,
ePi − e
S
i = −
4Ti + 18Tj
27
< 0.
The total quantity qPi produced by firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
qPi =
30Tj
27
.
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The total quantity qSi at the social optimum is
qSi =
4Tj
3
.
Hence,
qPi − q
S
i = −
2Tj
9
< 0 .
The aggregate quantity QPi in the market of country Xi at the subgame Nash perfect equi-
librium is
QPi =
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
27
.
The aggregate quantity QSi at the social optimum is
QSi =
2Ti + 2Tj
3
.
Hence,
QPi −Q
S
i = −
4Ti + 2Tj
27
< 0 .
The inverse demand function pPi of the firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
pPi = α−
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
27
.
The inverse demand function pSi at the social optimum is
pSi = α−
2Ti + 2Tj
3
.
Hence,
pPi − p
S
i = Q
S
i −Q
P
i > 0.
Recall that AW,i = 2(Ti + 2Tj)/9. The profit π
P
i of the firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect
equilibrium is
πPi =
1
9
[
(2Tj +AW,i)
2 + 4(Tj −AW,j)
2
]
.
The profit πSi of the firm Fi at the social optimum is
πSi =
8T 2j
9
.
Hence,
πPi − π
S
i =
4
36
(8T 2i + 20TiTj − 37T
2
j ) .
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Let K be such that Ti = KTj . Recall that in this case 0.5 ≤ K ≤ 2. Hence,
πPi − π
S
i =
4T 2j
36
(8K2 + 20K − 37) .
Thus, there are two possible subcases:
(a) 0.81 . . . ≤ K ≤ 1.23 . . ., then
πPi − π
S
i < 0 and π
P
j − π
S
j < 0 .
(b) 1.24 . . . ≤ K ≤ 2 (case (c) 0.5 ≤ K ≤ 0.8 . . . is similar), then
πPi − π
S
i > 0 and π
P
j − π
S
j < 0 .
The custom revenue CRPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
CRPi =
22
35
(Tj + 2Ti)(5Ti − 2Tj) .
The custom revenue CRSi at the social optimum is
CRSi = 0 .
Hence,
CRPi − CR
S
i = CR
P
i > 0 .
The consumer surplus CSPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
CSPi =
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
2
36
.
The consumer surplus CSSi at the social optimum is
CSSi =
2(Ti + Tj)
2
9
.
Hence,
CSPi − CS
S
i =
−64T 2i − 100TiTj − 34T
2
j
36
< 0 .
The welfare WPi of the country Xi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
WPi = π
P
i + CR
P
i + CS
P
i .
The welfare W Si of the country Xi at the social optimum is
W Si = π
S
i + CR
S
i + CS
S
i .
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Hence,
WPi −W
S
i =
2
36
(44T 2i − 4TiTj − 103T
2
j ) .
Let K be such that Ti = KTj . Hence,
WPi −W
S
i =
2T 2j
36
(44K2 − 4K − 103) .
Thus, there are two possible subcases:
(a) 0.64 . . . ≤ K ≤ 1.57 . . ., then
WPi −W
S
i < 0 and W
P
j −W
S
j < 0 .
For instance, when Ti = Tj .
(b) 1.58 . . . ≤ K ≤ 2 (case (c) 0.5 ≤ K ≤ 0.63 . . . is similar), then
WPi −W
S
i > 0 and W
P
j −W
S
j < 0 .
Case II: 2Ti < Tj < 5Ti/2 (0.4Ti < Tj < 0.5Ti is similar). The Nash tariffs for the first stage
game are
(tNi , t
N
j ) =
(
2(Tj + 2Ti)/9, 2(Ti + 2Tj)/9
)
.
The social tariffs for the first stage game are
(tSi , t
S
j ) = (BWS ,i, 0) .
The home quantity hPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
hPi =
4(5Tj + Ti)
27
.
The home quantities hSi and h
S
i at the social optimum are
hSi =
4(Tj − Ti)
3
and hSj =
2Ti
3
.
Hence,
hPi − h
S
i =
8(5Ti − 2Tj)
27
≥ 0 and hPj − h
S
j =
2Ti + 4Tj
27
> 0 .
The export quantity ePi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
ePi =
2(5Tj − 2Ti)
27
.
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The export quantities eSi and e
S
j at the social optimum are
eSi =
2Tj
3
and eSj =
10Ti − 4Tj
3
.
Hence,
ePi − e
S
i = −
4Ti + 8Tj
27
< 0 and ePj − e
S
j =
16(2Tj − 5Tj)
27
< 0 .
The total quantity qPi produced by firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
qPi =
10Tj
9
.
The total quantities qSi and q
S
j at the social optimum are
qSi =
6Tj − 4Ti
3
and qSj =
4(3Ti − Tj)
3
.
Hence,
qPi − q
S
i =
12(3Ti − 2Tj)
27
< 0
and
qPj − q
S
j =
2(6Tj − 13Ti)
9
,
1) if 12Ti < 6Tj < 13Ti, then q
P
j − q
S
j < 0;
2) if 13Ti ≤ 6Tj < 15Ti, then q
P
j − q
S
j ≥ 0.
The aggregate quantity QPi in the market of country Xi at the subgame Nash perfect equi-
librium is
QPi =
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
27
.
The aggregate quantities QSi and Q
S
i at the social optimum are
QSi = 2Ti and Q
S
j =
2Ti + 2Tj
3
.
Hence,
QPi −Q
S
i =
8(2Tj − 5Ti)
27
< 0 and QPi −Q
S
i = −
2Ti + 4Tj
27
< 0 .
The inverse demand function pPi of the firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
pPi = α−
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
27
.
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The inverse demand functions pSi and p
S
j at the social optimum are
pSi = α− 2Ti and p
S
j = α−
2Ti + 2Tj
3
.
Hence,
pPi − p
S
i = Q
S
i −Q
P
i > 0 and p
P
j − p
S
j = Q
S
j −Q
P
j > 0.
Recall that AW,i = 2(Tj + 2Ti)/9. The profit π
P
i of the firm Fi at the subgame Nash perfect
equilibrium is
πPi =
1
9
[
(2Tj +AW,i)
2 + 4(Tj −AW,j)
2
]
.
The profits πSi and π
S
j of the firms Fi and Fj at the social optimum are
πSi =
1
9
[
16T 2i + 20T
2
j − 32TiTj
]
and
πSj =
1
9
[
104T 2i + 16T
2
j − 80TiTj
]
.
Hence,
πPi − π
S
i =
16
36
(−70T 2j + 167TiTj − 79T
2
i )
and
πPj − π
S
j =
4
36
(−316T 2j + 1640TiTj − 1981T
2
i ) .
Let K be such that Tj = KTi then, in this case 2 < K < 2.5. Therefore,
πPi − π
S
i =
16T 2i
36
(−70K2 + 167K − 79) < 0
and
πPj − π
S
j =
4T 2i
36
(−316K2 + 1640K − 1981) < 0 .
The custom revenue CRPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
CRPi =
22
35
(Tj + 2Ti)(5Ti − 2Tj) .
The custom revenues CRSi and CR
S
j at the social optimum are
CRSi =
4
3
[
9TiTj − 10T
2
i − 2T
2
j
]
and CRSj = 0 .
Hence,
CRPi − CR
S
i =
16
35
(40T 2j − 182TiTj + 205T
2
i )
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Let K be such that Tj = KTi then
CRPi − CR
S
i =
16T 2i
35
(40K2 − 182K + 205) .
In this case 2 < K < 2.5. Therefore,
1) if 2 < K < 2.05 . . ., then CRPi − CR
S
i > 0 ;
2) if 2.05 . . . ≤ k < 2.5, then CRPi − CR
S
i < 0
and
CRPj − CR
S
j = CR
P
j > 0 .
The consumer surplus CSPi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
CSPi =
2(7Ti + 8Tj)
2
36
.
The consumer surpluses CSSi and CS
S
j at the social optimum are
CSSi = 2T
2
i and CS
S
j =
2(Ti + Tj)
2
9
.
Hence,
CSPi − CS
S
i =
2
36
(64T 2j + 112TiTj − 1409T
2
i )
Let K be such that Tj = KTi then in this case 2 < K < 2.5. Therefore,
CSPi − CS
S
i =
2T 2i
36
(64K2 + 112K − 1409) < 0
and
CSPj − CS
S
j =
−64T 2j − 100TiTj − 34T
2
i
36
< 0 .
The welfare WPi of the country Xi at the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium is
WPi = π
P
i + CR
P
i + CS
P
i .
The welfare W Si of the country Xi at the social optimum is
W Si = π
S
i + CR
S
i + CS
S
i .
Hence,
WPi −W
S
i =
2
36
(464T 2j − 2920TiTj + 2879T
2
i )
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and
WPj −W
S
j =
2
36
(−604T 2j + 3236TiTj − 3991T
2
i ) .
Let K be such that Tj = KTi. Hence,
WPi −W
S
i =
2T 2i
36
(464K2 − 2920K + 2879) < 0
and
WPj −W
S
j =
2T 2i
36
(−604K2 + 3236K − 3991) > 0 .
Case III: 5Ti ≤ 2Tj (5Tj ≤ 2Ti is similar). The Nash tariffs for the first stage game are
(tNi , t
N
j ) =
(
Ti, 2(Ti + 2Tj)/9
)
.
The social tariffs for the first stage game are
(tSi , t
S
j ) = (Ti, 0) .
The home hPi and h
P
j quantities at the perfect Nash equilibrium are
hPi =
2Tj + Ti
3
and
hPj =
4(5Ti + Tj)
27
.
The home hPi and h
P
j quantities at the social optimum are
hSi = h
P
i =
2Tj + Ti
3
and
hSj =
2Ti
3
.
Hence,
hPi − h
S
i = 0
and
hPj − h
S
j =
2(Ti + 2Tj)
27
> 0 .
The export ePi and h
P
j quantities at the perfect Nash equilibrium are
ePi =
2(5Tj − 2Ti)
27
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and
ePj = 0 .
The export eSi and h
S
j quantities at the social optimum are
eSi =
2Tj
3
and
eSj = 0 .
Hence,
ePi − e
S
i = −
4(Ti + 2Tj)
27
< 0
and
ePj − e
S
j = 0 .
The total quantities qPi and q
P
j respectively, produced by the firms Fi and Fj at the perfect
Nash equilibrium are
qPi =
28Tj + 5Ti
27
and
qPj = h
P
j .
The total quantities qSi and q
S
j respectively, produced by the firms Fi and Fj at the social optimum
are
qSi =
4Tj + Ti
3
and
qSj = h
S
j =
2Ti
3
.
Hence,
qPi − q
S
i = −
4(Ti + 2Tj)
27
< 0
and
qPj − q
S
j =
2(Ti + 2Tj)
27
> 0 .
The aggregate quantities QPi and Q
P
j respectively, in the market of countries Xi and Xj at
the perfect Nash equilibrium are
QPi = h
P
i =
2Tj + Ti
3
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and
QPj =
2(8Ti + 7Tj)
27
.
The aggregate quantities QSi and Q
S
j respectively, produced by the firms Fi and Fj at the social
optimum are
QSi = Q
P
i = h
P
i
and
QSj =
2(Ti + Tj)
3
.
Hence,
QPi −Q
S
i = 0
and
QPj −Q
S
j = −
2(Ti + 2Tj)
27
< 0 .
The inverse demand functions pPi and p
P
j respectively, of the firms Fi and Fj at the perfect
Nash equilibrium are
pPi = α−
2Tj + Ti
3
and
pPj = α−
2(8Ti + 7Tj)
27
.
The inverse demand functions pPi and p
P
j respectively, of the firms Fi and Fj at the social optimum
are
pSi = p
P
i = α−
2Tj + Ti
3
and
pSj = α−
2(Ti + Tj)
3
.
Hence,
pPi − p
S
i = 0
and
pPj − p
S
j = Q
S
j −Q
P
j =
2(Ti + 2Tj)
27
> 0 .
The profits πPi and π
P
j of the firms Fi and Fj at the perfect Nash equilibrium respectively,
are
πPi =
1
9
[(2Tj + Ti)
2 + 4(Tj −AW,j)
2]
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and
πPj =
1
9
(2Ti +AW,j)
2 .
The profits πSi and π
S
j of the firms Fi and Fj at the social optimum respectively, are
πSi =
1
9
[(2Tj + Ti)
2 + 4T 2j ]
and
πSj =
4
9
T 2i .
Hence,
πPi − π
S
i =
4
81
(T 2i − 5TiTj − 14T
2
j ) < 0
and
πPj − π
S
j =
1
9
(4TiAW,j +A
2
W,j) > 0 .
The custom revenues CRPi and CR
P
j at the perfect Nash equilibrium respectively, are
CRPi (ti) = 0
and
CRPj =
2AW,j(Tj −AW,j)
3
.
The custom revenues CRPi and CR
P
j at the social optimum respectively, are
CRSi = 0
and
CRSj = 0 .
Hence,
CRPi −CR
S
i = 0
and
CRPj − CR
S
j = CR
P
j =
2AW,j(Tj −AW,j)
3
> 0 .
The consumer surpluses CSPi and CS
P
j at the perfect Nash equilibrium respectively, are
CSPi =
(Ti + 2Tj)
2
18
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and
CSPj =
2(8Ti + 7Tj)
2
272
.
The consumer surpluses CSSi and CS
S
j at the social optimum respectively, are
CSSi = CS
P
i =
(Ti + 2Tj)
2
18
and
CSSj =
2(Ti + Tj)
2
9
.
Hence,
CSPi −CS
S
i = 0
and
CSPj − CS
S
j =
2
36
(−17T 2i − 32T
2
j − 50TiTj) < 0 .
The welfares WPi and W
P
j of the countries Xi and Xj at the perfect Nash equilibrium,
respectively, are
WPi = π
P
i + CS
P
i
and
WPj = π
P
j + CR
P
j + CS
P
j .
The welfares W Si and W
S
j of the countries Xi and Xj at the social optimum respectively, are
W Si = π
S
i + CS
S
i
and
WPj = π
S
j + CR
S
j + CS
S
j .
Hence,
WPi −W
S
i = π
P
i − π
S
i =
4
81
(T 2i − 5TiTj − 14T
2
j ) < 0
and
WPj −W
S
j = (π
P
j − π
S
j ) + (CR
P
j − CR
S
j ) + (CS
P
j − CS
S
j )
=
2
34
(Ti + 2Tj)
2 > 0 .
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3.1.7 Conclusions
For every pair of tariffs (ti, tj), we found the Nash equilibrium for the second subgame, i.e. the
home and export quantities such that the firms maximize strategically their profits. Then, using
the Nash equilibrium for the home and export quantities, we found the tariffs that lead to a Nash
equilibria or to a social equilibria for different utilities given by the relevant economic quantities.
We observed that the Nash equilibria and the social optimum tariffs for the home quantities are
the same and equal with the maximal tariff. For the export quantities all tariffs lead to a Nash
equilibrium but only the (0, 0) tariffs are a social optimum. These different behaviour in the
home and export quantities lead us to do a full analysis of the tariffs economical impact in all
the relevant economic quantities.
Export quantities (ei, ej) of the firms
Nash tariffs Social tariffs Game type
(ti, tj) with ti > 0 and tj > 0 (0, 0) PD
(0, 0) (0, 0) SE
(ti, 0) with ti > 0 (0, 0) LW
(0, tj) with tj > 0 (0, 0) LW
For the total quantities produced by the firms we found that the Nash tariffs are the maximal
tariffs and the social tariffs are the zero tariffs and, so, the game is of prisoner’s dilemma type. For
the aggregate quantities, prices, custom revenues and consumer surpluses we found that the Nash
tariffs coincide with the social tariffs. However, for the aggregate quantities and the consumer
surpluses the tariffs are zero; for the custom revenues are half of the maximal tariffs; and for the
prices, like for the home quantities, are the maximal tariffs.
SE game PD game
Econ. quantity hi Qi pi CRi CSi qi
Nash tariff Ti 0 Ti Ti/2 0 Ti
Social tariff Ti 0 Ti Ti/2 0 0
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For the profits of the firms we found that the Nash tariffs are the maximal tariffs and the
social tariffs can be zero or the maximal tariffs. If Ti and Tj are similar the Nash and social tariffs
are equal and the game is of the SE type; if Ti and Tj are too different the game is of the LW
type.
Profits (πi, πj) of the firms
Condition Nash tariffs Social tariffs Game type
If 0 < Tj < 3Ti/4 (Ti, Tj) (0, Tj) LW
If 3Ti/4 < Tj < 4Ti/3 (Ti, Tj) (Ti, Tj) SE
If Tj < 4Ti/3 (Ti, Tj) (Ti, 0) LW
For the welfares of the countries we found two types of Nash tariffs, three types of social
tariffs, and two types of games. We observe that for (0, 0) social tariffs and (AW,i, AW,j) Nash
tariffs, the game is of type PD if the maximal tariffs Ti and Tj are similar. However, the game is
of type LW if the maximal tariffs Ti and Tj are too different. In the LW type game, the country
with lower maximal tariff has a gain in its welfare and the country with higher maximal tariff has
a lost in its welfare when we compare their welfares at the Nash equilibrium with their welfares
at the social optimum.
Welfares (Wi,Wj) of the countries
Condition Nash tariffs Social tariffs Game type
If 0 < Tj ≤ 2Ti/5 (AW,i, Tj) (0, Tj) LW
If 2Ti/5 < Tj < Ti/2 (AW,i, AW,j) (0, BWS ,j) LW
If Ti/2 ≤ Tj < 0.63 . . . Ti (AW,i, AW,j) (0, 0) LW
If 0.63 . . . Ti < Tj < 1.57 . . . Ti (AW,i, AW,j) (0, 0) PD
If 1.57 . . . Ti < Tj ≤ 2Ti (AW,i, AW,j) (0, 0) LW
If 2Ti < Tj < 5Ti/2 (AW,i, AW,j) (BWS ,i, 0) LW
If 5Ti/2 ≤ Tj (Ti, AW,j) (Ti, 0) LW
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3.2 Uncertainty costs on an international duopoly with tariffs
In this section we study the effects of uncertainty in the initial production costs on the expected
profits of the firms and on the expected welfares of the countries.
In subsection 3.2.1 we compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the home and export quanti-
ties for the competing firms. In subsection 3.2.2, we find the Bayesian-Nash tariffs that maximize
the welfares of the countries. Then, we show that the decision of the governments to impose or
not a tariff can be interpreted as a game that it is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see [26]).
3.2.1 Costs uncertainty
In this subsection, for every pair of tariffs, we compute the home and export quantities practiced
by both firms at the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the second stage game. The static analysis
for the relevant economic quantities is done along the section and it comes straightforward from
the explicit formulas obtained.
We suppose that each firm has two different technologies L and H and uses one of them
according to a certain probability distribution. The use of one or the other technology affects the
unitary production cost
ci : {L,H} → R
+
0 ,
where ci,L < ci,H for i ∈ {1, 2}. For k ∈ {L,H} and i ∈ {1, 2}, let θi,k be the probability of the
firm Fi to use technology k. Hence, θi,H ≥ 0, θi,L ≥ 0 and θi,H + θi,L = 1.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, with i 6= j. Given a random variable
Xi,j : {L,H}
2 → R ,
the expectation Ei(Xi,j) : {L,H} → R, with respect to the technology of country Xi, is the
random variable
Ei(Xi,j)(kj) =
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kiXi,j(ki, kj)
and the expectation Ej(Xi,j) : {L,H} → R, with respect to the technology of country Xj , is the
random variable
Ej(Xi,j)(ki) =
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θj,kjXi,j(ki, kj) .
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Furthermore, the expectation E(X), with respect to the technologies of both countries, is
E(X) = Ei(Ej(Xi,j)) = Ej(Ei(Xi,j))
=
∑
ki∈{H,L}
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θi,kiθj,kjXi,j(ki, kj) ∈ R .
The home quantity hi and the export quantity ei of firm Fi are random variables
hi : {L,H} → R
+
0 and ei : {L,H} → R
+
0 .
The ex-ante profit πAi : {L,H} → R
+
0 of firm Fi is
πAi (hi, ei, hj , ej ; tj)(ki) = Ej
(
πi(hi, ei, hj , ej ; tj)
)
(ki)
=
∑
kj∈{H,L}
πi(hi(ki), ei(ki), hj(kj), ej(kj); tj) .
The expected cost Ei of the firm Fi is
Ei ≡ E(ci) =
∑
k∈{H,L}
θi,kci(k) ∈ R
+
0 .
The expected squared cost E2i of the firm Fi is
E2i ≡ E(c
2
i ) =
∑
k∈{H,L}
θi,k(ci(k))
2 ∈ R+0 .
The variance cost Vi of the firm Fi is
Vi ≡ V (ci) = E(c
2
i )−
(
E(ci)
)2
∈ R+0 .
The cost difference ∆i : {L,H} → R of Firm Fi is
∆i(ki) = ci(ki)− Ei .
Let
Ti ≡ Ti(ci, cj) = (α+ ci − 2cj)/2 .
The complete maximal tariff TEi of the government of state Xi is
TEi ≡ Ti(Ei, Ej) =
α+ E(ci)− 2E(cj)
2
.
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The incomplete maximal tariff T¯i of the government of state Xi is
T¯i = T
E
i −
3
4
∆i(H) .
Assumption 1: For all i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, we have T¯i > 0 and
0 ≤ ti ≤ T¯i .
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the second stage game is determined by the home quantities
and the export quantities that maximize the ex-ante profit of both firms.
Theorem 3.1. Let (ti, tj) ∈ [0, T¯i]× [0, T¯j ]. Under assumption 1, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the second stage game for the home consumption hBi (ti) : {L,H} → R
+
0 is
hBi (ki; ti) =
1
3
(
2TEj + ti
)
−
1
2
∆i(ki) ;
and for the export quantity eBi (tj) : {L,H} → R
+
0 is
eBi (ki; tj) =
2
3
(
TEj − tj
)
−
1
2
∆i(ki) ,
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i.
From Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following expected economic quantities. The expected home
quantity is
E
(
hBi (ti)
)
=
2TEj + ti
3
.
Hence, the expected Bayesian-Nash home quantity E
(
hBi (ti)
)
increases with the tariff ti. The
expected export quantity is
E
(
eBi (tj)
)
=
2
3
(
TEj − tj
)
Hence, the expected Bayesian-Nash export quantity E
(
eBi (tj)
)
decreases with the tariff tj but
does not depend upon the tariff ti. The Bayesian-Nash total quantity
qBi (ti, tj) : {L,H} → R
+
0
produced by the firm Fi is
qBi (ki; ti, tj) = h
B
i (ti) + e
B
i (tj) =
4TEi + ti − 2tj
3
−∆i(ki) .
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Thus, the expected Bayesian-Nash total quantity is
E(qBi (ti, tj)) =
4TEi + ti − 2tj
3
.
Hence, qBi (ti, tj)(ki) and E(q
B
i (ti, tj)) increase with ti and decrease with tj. The Bayesian-Nash
aggregate quantity
Qi(ti) : {L,H}
2 → R+0
in the market of the country Xi is
QBi (ki, kj ; ti) =
2(TEi + T
E
j )− ti
3
−
∆i(ki) + ∆j(kj)
2
.
Thus, the expected Bayesian-Nash aggregate quantity is
E(QBi (ti)) =
2(TEi + T
E
j )− ti
3
.
Hence, the expected Bayesian-Nash aggregate quantity E(QBi (ti)) decreases with tariff ti. The
Bayesian-Nash inverse demand function
pBi (ti) : {L,H}
2 → R
is
pBi (ki, kj ; ti) ≡ p
B
i (ci(ki), cj(kj), Ei, Ej ; ti)
= α−
2(TEi + T
E
j )− ti
3
+
∆i(ki) + ∆j(kj)
2
.
Thus, the expected Bayesian-Nash inverse demand function is
E(pBi (ti)) = α−
2(TEi + T
E
j )− ti
3
.
The expected Bayesian-Nash inverse demand function increase with tariff ti. The ex-post Bayesian-
Nash profit
πBi (ti, tj) : {L,H}
2 → R
is
πBi (ki, kj ; ti, tj) ≡ π
B
i (ci(ki), cj(kj), Ei, Ej ; ti, tj)
=
(
pBi (ki; ti)− ci(ki)
)
hBi (ki; ti) +
(
pBj (kj ; tj)− ci(ki)− tj
)
eBi (kk; tj)
= 19
[
(2TEj + ti)
2 + 4(TEj − tj)
2
]
+
4TEj +ti−2tj
6 ∆j −
1
2∆i∆j +
1
2∆
2
i .
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Furthermore,
∂πBi
∂ti
=
2
9
(2TEj + ti) +
∆j
6
.
Noting that
∂2πBi
∂t2i
> 0 ,
we obtain that the local maxima of πBi is attained at the boundary points of the admissible tariffs
tBRi (tj ;π
B
i (ki, kj)) ∈ {0, T¯i} .
The expected Bayesian-Nash profit is
E(πBi (ti, tj)) =
(2TEj + ti)
2 + 4(TEj − tj)
2
9
+
Vi
2
.
Hence, the expected Bayesian-Nash profit E(πBi (ti, tj)) increases with tariff ti and decrease with
tariff tj. The Bayesian-Nash custom revenue
CRBi (ti) : {L,H} → R
is
CRBi (kj ; ti) =
2ti(T
E
i − ti)
3
−
ti
2
∆j(kj) .
Furthermore,
∂CRi
∂ti
=
2(TEi − 2ti)
3
−
∆j(kj)
2
,
and
∂2CRi
∂t2i
< 0 .
Hence, the Bayesian-Nash custom revenue CRBi (kj ; ti) increases with tariff ti ∈ [0, T
E
i /2 −
3/8∆j(kj)] and decreases with tariff ti ∈ [T
E
i /2 − 3/8∆j(kj), T¯
E
i ]. The expected Bayesian-Nash
custom revenue is
E(CRBi (ti)) =
2ti(T
E
i − ti)
3
.
The Bayesian-Nash consumer surplus
CSBi (ti) : {L,H}
2 → R
is
CSBi (ki, kj ; ti) =
1
18
(2TEi + 2T
E
j − ti)
2 + (
ti
6
−
TEi + T
E
j
3
)(∆i +∆j)
+
∆i∆j
4
+
1
8
(∆2i +∆
2
j)
82
Furthermore,
∂CSi
∂ti
=
ti − 2(T
E
i + T
E
j )
9
+
∆i +∆j
6
< 0 ,
and
∂2CSi
∂t2i
> 0 .
Hence, the Bayesian-Nash consumer surplus CSBi (ki, kj ; ti) decreases with tariff ti ∈ [0, T¯
E
i ]. The
expected Bayesian-Nash consumer surplus is
E(CSi(ti)) =
(2TEi + 2T
E
j − ti)
2
18
+
Vi + Vj
8
.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Following [26], for i, j ∈ {L,H} with i 6= j, the Bayesian-Nash home
quantities
hBi : {L,H} → R
+
0 and h
B
j : {L,H} → R
+
0
and the Bayesian-Nash export quantities
eBi : {L,H} → R
+
0 and e
B
j : {L,H} → R
+
0
are the solutions of the maximization problem
max(hi,ei) π
A
i (hi, ei, hj , ej ; tj)
= max(hi,ei)
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θj,kj
[(
α− hi(ki)− ej(kj)− ci(ki)
)
hi(ki)
+
(
α− hj(kj)− ei(ki)− ci(ki)− tj)ei(ki)
]
= max(hi,ei)
(
α− hi(ki)− ci(ki)−
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θj,kjej(kj)
)
hi(ki)
+
(
α− ei(ki)− ci(ki)− tj −
∑
kj∈{H,L}
hj(kj)
)
ei(ki) ,
and of the maximization problem
max(hj ,ej) π
A
j (hi, ei, hj , ej ; ti)
= max(hj ,ej)
(
α− hj(kj)n − cj(kj)−
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kiei(ki)
)
hj(kj)
+
(
α− ej(kj)− cj(kj)− ti −
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kihi(ki)
)
ej(kj) .
Therefore, these optimization problems are equivalent to the following two independent optimiza-
tion problems for each market: In the market of the country Xi,
maxhi(ki) hi(ki)
(
α− hi(ki)− ci(ki)−
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θj,kjej(kj))
)
maxej(kj) ej(kj)(α − ej(kj)− cj(kj)− ti −
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kihi(ki)) ;
83
and in the market of the country Xj ,
maxhj(kj) hj(kj)
(
α− hj(kj)− cj(kj)−
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kiei(ki))
)
maxei(ki) ei(ki)(α− ei(ki)− ci(ki)− tj −
∑
kj∈{H,L}
hj(kj)) .
Hence, in the market of the country Xi, by the first order condition, we obtain
hi(ki) = (α− ci(ki)−
∑
kj∈{H,L}
θj,kjej(kj))/2
ej(kj) = (α− cj(kj)− ti −
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kihi(ki))/2 .
Therefore, by solving the system of four equations with four unknowns hi(L), hi(H), ej(L) and
ej(H), we obtain
hBi (ki) = (2T
E
j + ti)/3−∆i(ki)/2
eBj (kj) = 2(T
E
i − ti)/3−∆j(kj)/2 .
Similarly, in the market of the country Xj , we obtain
hj(kj) = (α− cj(kj)−
∑
ki∈{H,L}
θi,kiei(ki))/2
ei(ki) = (α− ci(ki)− tj −
∑
kj∈{H,L}
hj(kj))/2 .
Therefore, by solving the system of four equations with four unknowns hj(L), hj(H), ei(L) and
ei(H), we obtain
hBj (kj) = (2T
E
i + tj)/3−∆j(kj)/2
eBi (ki) = 2(T
E
j − tj)/3−∆i(ki)/2 .
3.2.2 Welfare and the Prisioner’s dilemma for tariffs
In this subsection, we find the subgame perfect equilibrium that it is characterized by the the
Bayesian-Nash tariffs that maximize the welfare of the countries using the Bayesian-Nash home
and export quantities found in the previous section. Then, we show that the decision of the
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governments to impose or not a tariff can be interpreted as a game that it is like the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
The ex-post Bayesian-Nash welfare WBi (ki, kj ; ti, tj) of the country Xi is
WBi (ki, kj ; ti, tj) = π
B
i (ki, kj ; ti, tj) + CR
B
i (ki; ti) + CS
B
i (ki, kj ; ti) .
The expected Bayesian-Nash welfare E(WBi (ti, tj)) of the country Xi is
E(WBi (ti, tj)) =
2
9
[(TEi + T
E
j )
2 + 4(TEj )
2 + (2TEi + T
E
j )ti − 4T
E
j tj)]
−
t2i
2
+
4t2j
9
+
1
8
(5Vi + Vj) .
Hence,
∂E(WBi )
∂ti
=
2
9
(2TEi + T
E
j )− ti .
and
∂2E(WBi )
∂t2i
= −1 < 0 .
The subgame perfect equilibrium consists in finding the tariffs that maximize the expected
Bayesian-Nash welfare of both countries. Hence, if 2TEj < 5T
E
i and 2T
E
i < 5T
E
j then, the
Bayesian-Nash tariffs (tBi , t
B
j ) are
(tBi , t
B
j ) =
(
2
9
(2TEi + T
E
j ) ,
2
9
(2TEj + T
E
i )
)
.
Theorem 3.2. If TEi /T
E
j ∈ [0.64, 1.57], then for the expected Bayesian-Nash welfares of the both
counties we have
E
(
WBi (t
B
i , 0)
)
> E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
> E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
> E
(
WBi (0, t
B
j )
)
.
Therefore, the inequalities obtained in Theorem 3.2 for the expected welfares of both countries
show that the decision of the governments to impose or not a tariff can be interpreted as a game
that it is like the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Proof. We have that
E
(
WBi (t
B
i , 0)
)
−E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
= E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
− E
(
WBi (0, t
B
j )
)
=
(tBi )
2
2
> 0 .
85
Since 7TEj > 2T
E
i , we get
E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
− E
(
WBi (0, t
B
j )
)
=
4
9
tBj (2T
E
j − t
B
j ) =
8
81
tBj (7T
E
j − 2T
E
i ) > 0 .
Furthermore, we have that
E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
− E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
=
2
36
(
103(TEj )
2 + 4TEi T
E
j − 44(T
E
i )
2
)
.
Letting K be such that TEj = KT
E
i , we get
E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
−E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
=
2(TEi )
2
36
(
103K2 + 4K − 44
)
.
Hence, if 0.64 ≤ K ≤ 1.57, then
E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
− E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
> 0 .
Therefore,
E
(
WBi (t
B
i , 0)
)
> E
(
WBi (0, 0)
)
> E
(
WBi (t
B
i , t
B
j )
)
> E
(
WBi (0, t
B
j )
)
.
3.2.3 Conclusions
We proved that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production
costs. We showed that the expected welfare of each government increases with the variances of
both production costs, being the effect of the variance of the production costs of the foreign firm
smaller than the effect of the variance of the production costs of the home firm.
We showed that the decision of the governments to impose or not a tariff can be interpreted
as a game where the utilities are the expected welfares of the governments. We show that this
game is like the Prisoner’s Dilemma because the welfares of the countries are higher in the case
where both governments do not impose tariffs than in the case where both governments decide
to impose the Bayesian-Nash tariffs.
For future research, it will be interesting a) to allow the intercept demands of both countries
not to be the same, since the countries can have markets with different dimensions; b) to consider
that both governments can choose export subsidies or production subsidies; c) to check the
robustness of the prisoner’s dilemma in these and other extensions.
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